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It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same
between private individuals.'
-

Abraham Lincoln

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's 2014
government contract decisions provide yet another opportunity to
evaluate how the federal government, and the Federal Circuit in
particular, has fulfilled the duty expressed by President Lincoln
above. The idea is "not that the government should lose every case
appealed to the Federal Circuit, but that the government, when it
waives its sovereign immunity, should be held to the same standards
as its opponents. "2
In recent years, a number of commentators have questioned
whether the Federal Circuit has lived up to President Lincoln's ideal.'
Ralph Nash, Professor Emeritus of Law at the George Washington
University Law School, argued that "[t]he Federal Circuit seems to
have slowly drifted away from this view of its role."4 As Professor
Steven Schooner of the George Washington University Law School
1. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2D SESS. app. 2 (1861). President Lincoln made
these remarks in the first year of the Civil War in asking Congress to grant to the
Court of Claims the power to make the court's judgments final.
2. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal CircuitJurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437,
1489 (2012).
3. In fairness to the current Federal Circuit, criticism of the court's failure to
operate a level playing field in government contracts is nothing new. See, e.g., David
R. Hazelton, The Federal Circuit's Emerging Role in Bid Protest Cases, 36 AM. U. L. REv.
919, 933 (1987) (discussing "[t]he Federal Circuit's long-standing pro-agency bias").
4. Ralph C. Nash, Jr., The Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 586, 588 (2010). Professor Nash explicitly contrasts the Federal
Circuit's view with that of the Court of Claims, which he contends held the view that
"[niothing could be more important than ensuring that the citizens of this country
believe that their federal government treats them fairly." Id. at 587-88.
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explained, "rather than elevating fairness to the citizen as its foremost
priority, the court has adopted a strong deference toward the
government, regardless of whether in the role of plaintiff or
defendant." 5 Stanfield Johnson's criticism of the Federal Circuit has
been just as pointed:
[T]he Federal Circuit has made protection of the public fisc its
priority. Plainly, the decisions show that it is no longer
considered a priority or "special responsibility" of the court "to
make government officials accountable to the citizens whose
servants they are" or for the Government to "render prompt
justice against itself."6
All of these commentators based their opinions on Federal Circuit
decisions that they believed failed to provide contractors with a level
playing field.7
However, such a case-by-case review potentially
overlooks the bigger picture as to how the government, as a litigant,
is regularly treated by the Federal Circuit.
This Article examines whether there is in fact empirical support for
these commentators' position that the Federal Circuit's approach to
government contract cases favors the government. To conduct an
examination that avoids the limitations of a case-by-case review, this
Article performs a high-level review of all of the Federal Circuit's
government contracts cases decided in 2010 through 2014, paying
particular attention to both the overall rate at which the government
prevails and the rate at which the government prevails when it is the
appellant. The findings demonstrate that the government prevails at
the Federal Circuit in the majority of its cases. However, when those
decisions are reviewed to consider the types of cases and whether the
government or the contractor is appealing the underlying U.S. Court
of Federal Claims (COFC) or Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) s
5. Steven L. Schooner & Pamela J. Kovacs, Affirmatively Inefficient Jurisprudence?:
Confusing Contractors' Rights to Raise Affirmative Defenses with Sovereign Immunity, 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 685, 700 (2012).
6. W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit's Great Dissenter and Her "National
Policy of Fairnessto Contractors" 40 PuB. CONT. L.J. 275, 346 (2011) (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., id. (reviewing and praising Judge Newman's dissents that advocate
for a "frustrated national conscience" and her calls for "a national policy of fairness
to contractors" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schooner & Kovacs, supra note
5, at 701-02 (reviewing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in
M. Maropakis Carpentry v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323 (3d Cir. 1994), and arguing
that it is a prime example of how the Federal Circuit's strict constructionist analysis
in government contract disputes can result in favorable treatment for the government).
8. This includes the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), the
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA), and, less commonly, the Postal Service
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decision, the government and contractors appear to have very similar
rates of success.'
Although a superficial review of the empirical evidence could lead
one to argue that the government wins more than its share of cases,
the Federal Circuit's 2014 decisions do not appear to favor the
government. Indeed, the court's 2014 decisions resulted in wins for
contractors in significant cases where a formal rule-based approach
could have easily resulted in losses for the contractors.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Federal Circuit's Unique Role in Reviewing Government Contracts

The Supreme Court has made clear that the government should be
held to the same legal standards as private parties once it has decided
to enter into a contract, having declared that "[w]hen the United
States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are
governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between
private individuals."" This has been the Supreme Court's position
for almost 140 years."
The Federal Circuit has a unique responsibility to hold the
government accountable for its conduct when it steps "down from its
position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce." 2 As
Judge Marion Bennett, a former judge on the Court of Claims and
the Federal Circuit, explained, "[H]olding the Government and its
officials to a strict code of conduct in their relations with citizens...
is a special responsibility for a court created as the main forum for

Board of Contract Appeals. Historically, before 2007, this would also include various
agency boards of contract appeals.
9. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (observing that the government
was the prevailing party in 60% of the Federal Circuit's government contract
decisions from 2010 through 2014); see also infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text
(finding that the government, when appealing a lower court decision, prevailed in
44.4% of cases between 2010 and 2014).
10. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); see also Franconia Assocs. v.
United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002) (suggesting that the United States acts "much
as a party never cloaked with immunity" when it contracts with private parties).
11. Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) ("If [a government] comes
down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it
submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there.").
12. Id.
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claims against the sovereign.""
Indeed, this principle of dealing
fairly with commercial contractors is imbedded in the fabric of
government contracting-the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR)-which requires the government to "[c]onduct business with
integrity, fairness, and openness." 4
However, many commentators have pointed to a number of
fundamental principles that they assert demonstrate that the Federal
Circuit is not providing a level playing field for the government and
its contractors. For instance, Professor Nash analyzed seven areas
where the Federal Circuit has reached conclusions that he claimed
lead to more favorable treatment for the government, including the
process of contract interpretation, government employees'
contracting authority, bad faith, accounting disputes, unabsorbed
overhead damages, interest on claims, and Tucker Actjurisdiction. 5
B. EmpiricalReview of FederalCircuit Government Contract Cases
Focusing on particular decisions-and whether they tilt the playing
field to the advantage of the government litigant-has been the
methodology used by the critics referenced above. 6 However, the
critics' case-by-case approach potentially misses the broader impact
on contractors involved in litigation. Further, an anecdotal review
fails to reveal whether the government is winning its expected share
of cases before the Federal Circuit.
For the purpose of determining whether the government is, in fact,
winning an expected share of cases, this Article reviews the Federal
Circuit's government contract decisions from 2010 through 2014.17
At the most superficial level of review-without attempting to parse
or group the decisions-the government was the prevailing party"8 in

13.

WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS:

A HISTORY,

PART II: ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION 1855-1978 170 (1978).

14.

FAR 1.102(b)(3) (2014).

15.

See generally Nash, supra note 4, at 588-612 (providing Professor Nash's

analysis respecting the seven areas).
16. See, e.g., id. at 588.
17. There are some instances where it is not entirely clear whether a case should
be included as a government contract case. For our purposes, we have utilized the
work of the authors of prior government contract annual reviews to identify the
relevant government contract cases.
18. Not all cases have a clear and decisive winner. For purposes of this review, we
determined the prevailing party by identifying which party either prevailed on a
larger number of issues or the largest dollar value issue.
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60% of those cases.' 9 While a 60% prevailing rate confirms that the
government, which is always a participant in government contract
cases, is winning most of its cases at the Federal Circuit, this fact
alone does not mean that the Federal Circuit favors the government.
Indeed, there are multiple reasons why the government could prevail
in more than 50% of the cases without the Federal Circuit favoring
the government.
One significant factor in examining the government's success rate
is the ratio of the different types of appeals that reach the Federal
Circuit. For a variety of reasons, the number of government contract
cases heard by the Federal Circuit might include fewer government
appeals than contractor appeals, and one would expect the
government to prevail at a higher rate when it is defending the
COFC's or a BCA's decision.2" Indeed, one would expect appellees to
naturally have a higher success rate than appellants in federal
appellate litigation across all circuits, particularly since appellees have
already won once at a lower court. To control for this potential
variance, this analysis examines cases in which the government is the
appellant.2 And in these cases, the rate of success drops below
50%-the government prevailed in only 44.4% of the cases.22
These government rates of success on appeal are not significantly
higher than the contractors' rates of success on appeal. Based on the
same data, contractors prevailed in 37.79% of cases in which they
were the appellants before the Federal Circuit. Thus, the difference
in success rates on appeal between contractors and the government19. For the purposes of statistical analysis, there was a relatively small sample size,
which can potentially explain any of these results. Specifically, the analysis includes
ninety cases from 2010 through 2014. When excluding Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)
cases and cases deriving from United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), from
the analysis, the sample size is seventy-two cases.
20. One potential reason for greater government success is that the government
may exercise more discretion in choosing which judgments to appeal by virtue of the
fact that the government can appeal only with the approval of the Solicitor
General-a feature that not only promotes uniformity in the government's litigating
positions on appeal but also likely prevents appeals in cases the Solicitor General
believes to be sure losers. Another possibility is that because the government has so
much more experience in these cases (it participates as a party in every government
contract case), it simply has developed more expertise and the most effective
litigation strategies.
21. This analysis only includes instances where the government was the sole
appellant. Cross-appeals are excluded.
22. In cases where the government is either appealing or cross-appealing-in other
words, if cross-appeals are included-the government prevails in 55.6% of the cases.
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without considering any other factors-appears to be only about 7%
in this relatively small sample size of cases. This slight difference is
not enough to suggest-at least empirically-that the Federal Circuit
favors the government in cases involving government contracts.
Looking at the data in greater detail, there are significant
differences in the types of government contract cases, which further
undermine the notion of any perceived favoritism at the Federal
Circuit. For instance, between 2010 and 2014, the government
prevailed in 83.3% of bid protests brought before the Federal Circuit.
However, that statistic is heavily skewed by the mix of cases. There
were eighteen bid protest cases before the Federal Circuit from 2010
through 2014. Sixteen of those cases were appeals brought by the
contractor protesting the award.
Given the highly deferential
23
standard the government receives when conducting a procurement
and the additional deference given to the decision of the COFC,2 4 the
government should be expected to prevail in the vast majority of bid
protest appeals brought by contractors-which is precisely what the
data shows.
Contractors prevailed in two of sixteen protests
appealed, or 12.5% of the time.25
Indeed, the rate of success for contractors appealing bid protest
decisions of the COFC appears to be consistent with what would be
expected in federal appeals. The Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (AOUSC) maintains statistics on reversal
percentages. 26 According to the AOUSC statistics, across the federal

23. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("If the court finds a reasonable basis for the agency's action, the court should stay
its hand even though it might, as an original proposition, have reached a different
conclusion as to the proper administration and application of the procurement
regulations." (quoting Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed.
Cir. 1989))).
24. Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 645 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
("We review 'rulings on motions for judgment on the administrative record de
novo... and factual findings based on the administrative record for clear error."'
(alteration in original) (quoting PAI Corp. v. United States, 614 F.3d 1347, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2010))).
25. Of the two cases that the government appealed, the government prevailed in
one of two-or 50%-of its appealed bid protests. Needless to say, the sample size of
government appeals is too small to be much of an indicator.
26. See generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederaludicialCaseloadStatistics/caseloadstatistics-2014.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) (providing detailed statistical tables on
a yearly basis for appeals filed in the U.S. courts of appeals, including those
terminated on the merits).
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appellate system, appellants typically prevail in very low percentages
of their cases.17 For the twelve-month period ending March 31,
2014, the U.S. Courts of Appeals-excluding the Federal Circuitreversed or remanded to lower courts in only 8.7% of the cases
decided on the merits.

28

Furthermore, the reversed or remanded percentages are not
significantly higher when the AUOSC statistics are limited to civil
cases in which the United States was a party. Limiting the analysis to
cases that the AOUSC classifies as "Other U.S. Civil," which are civil
cases where the government is a party, and to "Administrative Agency
Appeals," the reversal or remand rate is still only 13%.29 If anything,
given the high standards of deference given to the agency in
conducting the procurement and deference to the COFC in hearing
the case, the contractors' prevailing rate of 12.5% in bid protest cases
appears to be higher than one might expect. Thus, the government's
overall prevailing rate in government contract cases appears to be
skewed by the government's very high success rate in bid protest
cases, which in this sample are heavily weighted toward contractor
appeals rather than government appeals.
In contrast to the bid protest cases, the government prevailed in
only 56.6% of the claims cases from 2010 to 2014. Comparing the
success rates of contractors and the government acting as appellants,
both the government and contractors appear to fair equally well.
The government prevailed in 44.4% of the claims cases in which it
was the appellant.30 Similarly, the contractors prevailed in 44.1% of

27. U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending (Details), U.S.
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2013/
Table202.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) (providing an overview of the increasing
number of appeals filed and terminated on the merits in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
excluding the Federal Circuit, from 1990 through 2013).
28. The courts reversed 2505 cases and remanded 523 cases out of a total of
34,717 cases terminated on the merits. See U.S. Courts of Appeals-Decisions in Cases
Terminated on the Merits, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding,During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2014, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2014/tables/BO5Marl 4.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
29. The courts reversed 183 cases and remanded thirty cases out of 1447 "Other
U.S. Civil" cases. In addition, the courts reversed 261 cases and remanded 195 cases
out of 3709 "Administrative Agency Appeals." Id.
30. The government was the sole appellant in nine claims cases between 2010
and 2014 and prevailed in four of those cases.
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the claims cases in which the contractor was the appellant." Thus,
rather than demonstrating that the Federal Circuit favors one side
over the other, the empirical data demonstrates that both parties
have virtually identical results as the appellant.
To summarize the above, the biggest drivers in explaining why the
government prevails in more government contract cases than the
protestors appears to be based on two specific factors that are wholly
unrelated to any formalism or pro-government tendencies. First, the
government-because of the applicable legal standards-enjoys a
substantial advantage in bid protest cases. 2 Second, the cases that
the Federal Circuit heard from 2010 to 2014 were primarily cases in
which the contractor was the appellant. In other words, one would
expect the government to be the prevailing party. Indeed, of the
ninety cases reviewed for this Article, contractors were the appellants
in fifty-three cases, the government was the appellant in nineteen
cases, and the parties were cross-appellants in eighteen cases. In
short, the government does not appear to prevail in cases before the
Federal Circuit more often than one would expect.
Based purely on this empirical review, it does not appear that the
Federal Circuit favors the government when resolving government
contract disputes.
C. Reviewing the FederalCircuit Government Contract Casesfor
Government Favoritism
While the empirical evidence does not support the critics' concern
with the Federal Circuit's approach to government contract cases,
there remains the possibility that the court favors the government in
ways that are not revealed through the data. For instance, if the court
routinely favored the government, that could impact the decisions
made by stakeholders, such as contractors and the government, as
well as judges on the COFC and the BCAs. In that scenario, the
court's positions could operate as a disincentive to contractors from
appealing lower court decisions, even when they believe their case is
meritorious. Conversely, a perceived favoritism for the government
might act as an incentive for the government to appeal to the Federal
31. The contractor was the sole appellant in thirty-four claims cases between
2010 and 2014 and prevailed in fifteen of those cases. The government and the
contractor cross-appealed ten cases between 2010 and 2014. The government was

the prevailing party in seven of those ten cases.
32. See supranote 23 (providing the deferential standard the government receives
in bid protest cases).
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Circuit more frequently. And of course, it is possible that if the
Federal Circuit favors the government, then judges on the COFC and
the BCAs could also tilt the balance in favor of the government in an
effort to lower the odds of reversal if a decision is challenged at the
Federal Circuit.
Faced with the empirical evidence discussed above that the Federal
Circuit does not rule in favor of the government a disproportionate
amount of the time in government contract appeals but recognizing
that any government favoritism might not be captured by the purely
empirical review, there remains the important question as to how to
review the Federal Circuit's decisions to investigate whether it does
favor the government.
Professor Nash offers three possible overarching decisional
approaches that the Federal Circuit may be following and which may
lead it to what Professor Nash describes as its "controversial
positions."3 The first is "the court's attempt to impose strict rules on
the law of government contracting....

The dogmatic application of

a strict legal rule in these situations-without a close analysis of the
factual nuances-can lead to unfair results."3 4 Professor Nash's
second possible explanation for the Federal Circuit's decision-making
process is a "mistrust of trial judges" and the crafting of rules that
take away discretion from the BCAs and the COFC to "assess the facts
fully and seek a fair outcome."35
Finally, his third possible
explanation is a "desire to impose more rigorous standards on the
people in the government and industry that draft and perform
government contracts."3 6
All of Professor Nash's possible explanations fit very well within the
concept of imposing "doctrines that will lead to easier, quicker, and
faster decisions" as the result of having ajudiciary disinterested in the
issues before it."7 Moreover, all of his explanations fit within the
broader criticisms of the Federal Circuit that it is too geared toward
33. Nash, supra note 4, at 612.
34. Id. at 612-13.
35. Id.at 613.
36. See id. at 614. This explanation could potentially result in decisions that favor
either party, and, as Professor Nash notes, all parties could benefit from more
rigorous standards. However, Professor Nash argues that government contracts are
frequently entered by individuals without formal legal training and performed under
stressful conditions. Therefore, Professor Nash contends that contractors frequently
view the imposition of strict rules as punitive. Id.
37. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 787, 820 (2008).
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formalism,38 and that formalism does not lead to better decisions. As
one commentator explained, "A formalistic doctrine is 'inquiry
truncating': only certain factors are considered. Thus, formalistic
doctrines make courts' jobs easier."" In short, critics contend that
formalism reduces the factors that a court must consider, leading to
easier reviews for courts but decisions that are less just.
This Article examines the Federal Circuit's 2014 government
contract cases with these criticisms in mind. It examines whether the
court applies formalism in these decisions by looking for instances in
which the court imposes bright-line rules, disregards or distrusts
lower courts' findings, and attempts to impose rigorous standards on
participants in government contracts. As explained in the analysis
below, the case-by-case review of all of the Court's 2014's decisions by
and large does not show a consistent use of formalism by the court to
find in favor of the government. Rather, several decisions suggest
quite the opposite-that the Federal Circuit is successfully
performing its role in ensuring fairness to the citizens.
II.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S 2014 CASES

The empirical evidence suggests that-at least during the past
several years-the Federal Circuit does not appear to be tilting the
playing field in favor of the government. However, the case-by-case
analysis undertaken by many other commentators purports to reach a
different conclusion.4" This Article reviews the Federal Circuit's 2014
decisions with the concern of government favoritism in mind. In
2014, the government continued to prevail in more cases than

38. See Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 1490 (stating that Professor Nash's critique of
the Federal Circuit "will again sound familiar to patent law scholars"). For a critic's
contention that the Federal Circuit's formalism leads to results against contractors
and in the government's favor, consider Mr.Johnson's discussion of the topic. See
Johnson, supra note 6, at 345 ("It is also an indication of the court's disinterest in the
general law between private individuals that in [two cases], the Federal Circuit
effectively concluded that the contractors had forfeited their claims.").
39. Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 275, 295
(2012) (footnote omitted).
40. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 2, at 1443, 1487-89 (discussing commentators'
concerns about the approach of the Federal Circuit in government contracts cases);
Johnson, supra note 6, at 346 (concluding that the Federal Circuit has moved away
from its role as the "nation's conscience" and instead favors the government unfairly
in its contracts jurisprudence (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schooner &
Kovacs, supra note 5, at 700-01 (examining the trend towards deference to the
government in government contracts cases).
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contractors. However, the Federal Circuit's decisions do not support
a finding of government favoritism even on a case-by-case basis.
Indeed, 2014 included significant cases where the Federal Circuit
failed to follow bright-line formalistic rules and where the playing
field between the government and contractors appeared level.
A.

Claims Cases

1. Bad faith
The claims cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2014 presented
three potential opportunities for the court to address its case law
regarding "bad faith." The court's "bad faith"jurisprudence is one of
the areas where Professor Nash has specifically faulted the court's
41
position and argued how it unfairly favors the government.
In short, the government, in a variety of contexts, has
argued-and some COFC judges have agreed 4 2 -that the Federal
Circuit's 2002 decision in Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United
States" indicates that "to prove breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing, a contractor must prove that the government
acted in bad faith with the specific intent to harm the contractor."" This
standard has been criticized by many, including the Court of
Federal Claims in Tecom, Inc. v. United States,45 where the court
declared that "it is clear, particularly when the specific aspects of the
duties to cooperate and not to hinder are at issue, that proof of
fraud, or quasi-criminal wrongdoing, or even bad intent are not
required."4 6 Professor Nash explained that the Federal Circuit
needed to weigh in and correct this misinterpretation:
It would be very helpful if the court would clear the air in this area
by... stating that cases involving the implied duties of good faith

41. Nash, supra note 4, at 603 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit could clarify its
bad faith jurisprudence by articulating that there is no presumption that government
employees' actions that injure contractors were reasonable).
42. See, e.g., S. Comfort Builders, Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 124, 153-55
(2005) (expounding on the high bar of proof for the bad faith standard and
ultimately denying Southern Comfort's claims based on its inability to meet that high
standard); Sys. Fuels Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 722, 735 (2005) (applying the
presumption that the government has acted in good faith to deny the plaintiffs
claim that the government breached the duty of good faith).
43. 281 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
44. Nash, supra note 4, at 600 (emphasis added). 45. 66 Fed. Cl. 736 (2005).
46. Id. at 770.
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and fair dealing and of disclosing superior knowledge have nothing
to do with the motive of the government employees in following
the course of action that injured the contractor and that there is no
presumption that the actions taken were reasonable.4 7
The Federal Circuit did address the standard in 2010 when
deciding Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States,48 which again
implied that for a contractor to prevail in a claimed breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, the contractor must prove bad
faith on the part of the government. The Federal Circuit explained

that "liability only attaches if the government action 'specifically
targeted' a benefit of Precision Pine's contract." 9 Commentators
claimed that the Federal Circuit's position was "inconsistent with
precedent" and "departs from well-established and widely cited common
law principles [where] a party to a contract violates its duty of good
faith and fair dealing (of which the duty to cooperate and not to
"150
hinder is a part) if that party unreasonably acts or fails to act ....
This requirement to prove bad faith and specific intent to harm
the contractor presents a nearly impossible burden for a contractor.
According to the Federal Circuit, disputing the presumption of good
faith in favor of the government requires "[a]lmost irrefragable
proof," which constitutes clear and convincing evidence.5 1 In other
words, there must be a specific intent to harm the contractor.
The Federal Circuit reviewed three cases in 2014 where the duty of
good faith and fair dealing-and potentially the bad faith
requirement-was at issue. In two of the cases, Bell/Heery v. United
States2 and Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc. v. United States, 53 the
court essentially determined that there was no breach of the
implied duty of good faith because the contracts allocated the
specific risks at issue to the contractors. 4 Therefore, Bell/Heery and
Lakeshore did not address the issue regarding the necessity of
proving bad faith. However, in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United
States,5 5 the Federal Circuit directly addressed the critics' concerns
47. Nash, supra note 4, at 603.
48. 596 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
49. Id. at 830.
50. Daniel P. Graham et al., FeatureComment: Fed. Cir. Resets Standardfor Breach of
the Duty to Cooperate and Not to Hinder,52 GOv'T CONTRAcrOR 97 (2010).
51. Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
52. 739 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
53. 748 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
54. Id. at 1349; Bell/Heery, 739 F.3d at 1335.
55. 742 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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with its decisions in Am-Pro and Precision Pine and made clear that
"bad faith" is not necessary to prove a breach of an implied duty of
56
good faith and fair dealing.
a.

Metcalf Construction Co. v. United States

The Federal Circuit in Metcalf provided clarity about the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 7 Metcalfsquarely confronted
the issue of proving bad faith and found that "bad faith" was not
required for a contractor to prevail in a claimed breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.5 8
i.

Background

Metcalf Construction Company ("Metcalf') entered into a
contract with the U.S. Navy to design and build housing units at the
Marine Corps Base in Hawaii.5 9 The initial Request For Proposals
(RFP) cited a government-commissioned report regarding the
building site's soil condition.6" A later version of the RFP stated that
the "soil reconnaissance report" was "for preliminary information
only."6'
In addition, the resulting contract incorporated FAR
52.326-2 concerning site conditions that materially differed from
the conditions disclosed in the contract and required that the
contractor conduct its own soil investigation.6 2 The Navy also
published a set of questions and answers clarifying that the contract
would be amended if the contractor's investigation revealed
significantly different soil conditions."
After winning the contract, Metcalf investigated the soil and
learned that the conditions differed from the Navy's report. 64 Metcalf
informed the Navy of the deviation and indicated that it wanted to
follow its consultant's recommendations for handling the soil, but the
Navy insisted
on
following
the
contractual
construction
requirements.65 Metcalf grew tired of waiting for the Navy's approval

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987.
Id.

61. Id. at 988 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65.

Id.
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after debating the issue for a year and began implementing its
66
preferred methods to deal with the soil conditions at a higher CoSt.
The Navy ultimately concluded that its original soil assessment was
correct and, therefore, that Metcalf was not entitled to additional
compensation for its decision to implement its consultant's
recommendations at the higher cost.67
Metcalf filed an unsuccessful claim with the Navy's contracting
officer for approximately $26 million in damages for additional costs
incurred due to the differing soil conditions and other issues on the
grounds that the Navy materially breached the contract and the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.' Metcalf then sued the
Navy in the COFC, and the government counterclaimed, seeking
damages for each day past the contractually agreed-upon completion
date that Metcalf had failed to meet.69 The trial court concluded that
Metcalf failed to establish liability under all of its alleged claims other
than two claims not at issue on appeal.7" The COFC determined,
based on its reading of case law and particularly Precision Pine, that
Metcalf failed to establish a breach of an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing because Metcalf did not show that the Navy
"specifically designed to reappropriate the benefits [that] the other
party expected to obtain from the transaction, thereby abrogating the
government's obligations under the contract."71
The
COFC
further
nullified
the
pre-bid
contractual
representations because the final contract required Metcalf to
investigate the soil conditions independently after it was awarded the
contract.7 2 Specifically, the COFC held that a reasonable contractor
would not have read the contract documents to mean that the
government was making a representation about the site conditions
since the contract required the contractor to make an independent
soil analysis.73 The contract therefore put the contractor on notice
66. Id.
67. Id.
However, the Navy did compensate Metcalf for two contract
modifications, which it approved-namely, further tests of the soil as well as the
building of two housing unit prototypes. Id. Later, the Navy also amended the
contract to approve the use of materials recommended by Metcalfs subcontractor. Id.
68. Id. at 989.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 989-90.
71. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 334, 346 (2011) (alteration
in original).
72. Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 995.
73. Id.
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that it could not rely on the government's report and put the risks
and costs of addressing new or different conditions on Metcalf.74
ii.

The Federal Circuitdecision

The Federal Circuit found that the COFC misread and misrelied
on PrecisionPine and took an "unduly narrow view of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing." 75 The Federal Circuit explained that Precision
Pine does not impose a "specific-targeting requirement" on all cases.76
The court stated that its decision in PrecisionPine provided "that the
government 'may be liable'-not that it was liable only--when a
subsequent government action is 'specifically designed to
reappropriate the benefits the other party expected to obtain from
the transaction." 77 Thus, "PrecisionPine did not hold that the absence
of specific targeting, by itself, would defeat a claim of breach of the
implied duty ....
Instead, the Federal Circuit found that a broader, reasonableness
standard is the correct standard for determining if the implied duty
has been beached.79 In general, the scope of the duty depends on
what is included in and expected from the underlying contract."s
The court explained that
[t]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing.., imposes
obligations on both contracting parties that include the duty not to
interfere with the other party's performance and not to act so as to
destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the

fruits of the contract.8
This duty includes both a duty not to hinder and a duty to
cooperate.8 2 Further, "[w] hat is promised or disclaimed in a contract
helps define what constitutes 'lack of diligence and interference with
83
or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.'

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 992-93.
Id. at 993.
Id. (quoting Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 829

(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 994.
80. Id. at 991.

81.

Id. (alteration in original).

82.

Id. (citing PrecisionPine & Timber, Inc., 596 F.3d at 820 n.1).
1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

83. Id. (quoting Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d
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The Federal Circuit then looked at the contractual provisions
related to the breach of the implied duty claim.' 4 The court found
that nothing in the contract's requirements or in the "Differing Site
Conditions" clause, FAR 52.236-2,8" warned Metcalf that it could not
rely on the Navy's representations about the soil's conditions or that
Metcalf bore the risk of any cost associated with an error in the
representations.8 6 Rather, the Navy included the soil report in its RFP
and pre-bid questions and answers to assist bidders in estimating costs
and submitting bids.87 The Federal Circuit concluded that including
the report and an independent evaluation requirement necessarily
dispelled any conclusion that the contractor would be financially
responsible for any post-award cost discrepancy.88 This interpretation
was reinforced by the contract's incorporation of FAR 52.236-2,
which "exists precisely in order to 'take at least some of the gamble
on subsurface conditions out of bidding."'89 The court concluded
that even though Metcalf was responsible for investigating site
conditions once the work began, the contractual provisions
protected Metcalf from the risk that the government's reports on
soil conditions were inaccurate.9
Given these conclusions about the implied covenant and the
contract's provisions, the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court's
judgment and remanded for further proceedings under the broader
and correct standard for the implied duty91 articulated in Centex Corp.
v. United States 2 and Malone v. United States.93
iii. Significance
After nearly a decade of decisions that critics claimed directly
contradicted prior precedent and commercial practice, the Federal

84. Id. at 994-95.
85. See FAR 52.236-2 (2014) (providing for an equitable adjustment "[i]f the
conditions do materially so differ and cause an increase or decrease in the

Contractor's cost of, or the time required for, performing any part of the work under
this contract, whether or not changed as a result of the conditions").
86. Metcalf,742 F.3d at 995-96.

87. Id. at 996.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Foster Constr. C.A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United States, 435

F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (per curiam)).
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 997.
395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
849 F.2d 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Circuit clarified its standards for proving a violation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. In addition, Metcalf provides a useful
interpretation of FAR 52.236-2, "Differing Site Conditions."
Contractors should no longer have to worry that the COFC or BCA
will require them to prove that the government acted in bad faith or
violated an express term of the contract to prove a breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Metcalf makes clear that
courts must apply the less rigorous "reasonableness" test to assess
allegations that the government violated the implied duty.94 In short,
Metcalf directly addressed one of the critics' specific concerns with the
Federal Circuit's approach to government contract cases-"bad
faith"-and ruled in favor of the contractor.
With regard to FAR 52.236-2, Metcalf disallows the use of broad
disclaimer language for the government to argue that the contractor
cannot rely on government-provided data and, thus, provides
contractors a chance to obtain relief on a differing site condition
claim.9 5 The government can no longer argue that a design-builder
assumes all risk and cannot rely upon initial information provided by
the government if the design-builder is required to do further site
investigation and final design after contract award.9 6
b.

Bell/Heery v. United States
i.

Background

Joint venture contractor Bell/Heery ("BH") entered into a contract
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) for the construction of a
federal correctional institution in New Hampshire.9 7 The RFP
specified that the operations needed to be performed in compliance
with the rules and regulations of the New Hampshire Department of
Environmental Sciences (NHDES), which required obtaining and
complying with an NHDES permit.98 The RFP further stated that the
contractor would be responsible for preparing the paperwork

94.

Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 994.

95.

Id. at 996.

96. Some commentators believe this decision may have impacts beyond federal
contract cases. E.g., Zach Jones, Differing Site Conditions: Court Affirms Contractor's
Reliance on Owner-Provided Geotech Information, 58 DESIGN COST DATA 14, 14 (2014);
Eric Frechtel, United States: Federal Circuit's Metcalf Decision a Big Win for Contractors,
MONDAQ Bus. BPJEFING, May 7, 2014.
97. Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
98. Id.
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required for applying for the permits, the permit application, and its
associated fees; for obtaining the permits; and for submitting
applications to the FBOP.99 The RFP also specified that the risks
associated with obtaining the permits were the contractor's
responsibility and that the government would not compensate the
contractor for any unexpected costs.' 0 In addition, the RFP included
a "Consultation, Review, and Inspection" provision that required the
contractor, in conjunction with the FBOP Project Management
Team, to consult with appropriate state officials in preparing for the
design of the project."0 '
After the government awarded the contract to BH, BH applied for
the required NHDES permits, but the NHDES rejected its
application.'0 2 BH advised the FBOP that the NHDES intended to
place various restrictions on BH's operations for the project, which
would likely result in delay and additional costs." 3 BH further
informed the FBOP that it was "reserving [its] rights for additional
compensation resulting from the requirement of.. . the [permit] as
well as future requirements of the permit."'0 4 However, BH did not
refuse to proceed with construction under the NHDES's restrictions
05
or ask the FBOP to intercede with the NHDES on BH's behalf.
BH commenced work, and the additional restrictions imposed by
the NHDES caused the work to proceed slower and with greater
costs. 6 BH repeatedly informed the FBOP of these issues and later
asserted that two individuals associated with the FBOP advised BH
"that it would be treated fairly with respect to the extra work caused
' °7
by the NHDES's administration of the ... permit." 1
BH submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment ("REA") to the
contracting officer for approximately $7.7 million.' 8 When the
contracting officer rejected the REA, BH sued the FBOP in the
COFC.'0 0 The COFC dismissed the case for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because the contract allocated
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1328.
Id.
Id. at 1328-29.

105. Id. at 1329.
106. Id.
107.
108.
109.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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the risk of increased costs for compliance to the contractor and
because the FBOP did not control the NHDES's actions."'
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision

(a) Breach of contract
BH argued on appeal that the contract's "Consultation, Review,
and Inspection" and "Changes" clauses limited BH's obligations
under the "Permits and Responsibility" clause."' Further, BH argued
that pursuant to the RFP's requirement that the FBOP consult with
the NHDES, the FBOP was obligated to work with BH involving the
changes dictated by the NHDES." 2 BH argued that the FBOP failed
to fulfill this duty and, thus, forced BH to concede to the NHDES's
3
determinations and incur the extra costs."
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that nothing in the
"Consultation, Review, and Inspection" provision created an
obligation for the FBOP concerning the increased costs or
interactions with the NHDES at issue." 4 Further, the court rejected
BH's argument that the FBOP breached the "Changes" clause by not
issuing an equitable adjustment to cover the additional costs
necessitated by the NHDES's restrictions. "' The court observed that
"there must have been a change in the form of a 'written or oral
order.., from the Contracting Officer that causes a change"' for the
"Changes" clause to apply.16 The court explained that the FBOP's
silence here did not establish a demonstrated acceptance of a
contractual change by the agency's contracting officer." 7 Because
the contract allocated the costs for complying with the NHDES's
permit to BH and because BH failed to identify any governmental
duty that contracted or complicated the risk allocation, the Federal
Circuit concluded that BH failed to demonstrate a cognizable claim
8
for breach of contract."

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1331-33.
Id. at 1333-34.

116. Id. at 1334 (quoting FAR 52.243-4(b) (2014)).

117. Id.
118. Id.
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(b) Breach of the implied covenant ofgood faith andfair dealing
The Federal Circuit explained that while every contract implies "a
duty of good faith and fair dealing that requires a party to refrain
from interfering with another party's performance or from acting to
destroy another party's reasonable expectations regarding the fruits
of the contract," an implied covenant "cannot 'create duties
inconsistent with the contract's provisions..'1.9 Here, BH alleged that
the FBOP breached its obligation by advising BH that it would be
treated fairly with respect to the NHDES's requirements and then
refusing to compensate BH for the additional costs and delays. 2 °
However, referencing Precision Pine, the court found that BH failed
to present any allegations that the FBOP "engaged in conduct that
reappropriated benefits promised to BH under the contract."12' As a
result, the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing could not
"form the basis for wholly new contract terms, particularly terms
which would be inconsistent with the express terms of the
agreement, " 2
Further, because BH's complaint focused on the
conduct of NHDES, an independent state agency, BH's "allegations
[did] not set forth a viable claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing."12

(c)

Significance

Bell/Heeiy appears to fit within the jurisprudence described by
commentators like Professor Nash, Professor Schooner, and Mr.
Johnson'2 4 in that it can be said to have followed formal rules and
strict reviews to deny a contractor an equitable result. The court here
read the provisions of the contract narrowly and with much scrutiny
and held that BH's arguments did not assert sufficient facts to create
the possibility of liability for the government despite multiple
warnings from the contractor about additional costs and delays if it
continued performance under the contract. Further, the court
narrowly interpreted the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
focusing on the contract's allocation of risk rather than subsequent
119.

Id. at 1334-35 (quoting Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304

(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
120. Id. at 1335.
121. Id.
122.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

123. Id.
124. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (describing the trend in the Federal
Circuit of affording the government more deference in these contract disputes).
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communications between the parties. Accordingly, contractors must
remember that the costs relating to certain risks-such as an outside
state agency interfering and disrupting a project-are allocated based
on the terms of the contract and are not necessarily based on what
they may believe to be fair. Further, contractors should ask the
government for direction as to how to proceed in writing when faced
with additional work and costs. However, with the subsequent
resolution of Metcalf, there is some question as to whether Bell/Heery
would arrive at the same result with regard to the implied duty of
good faith if litigated again.
c.

Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc. v. United States

As in Bell/Heery and Metcalf, the Federal Circuit in Lakeshore
Engineering Services, Inc., v. United States'25 addressed the allocation of

the risk of increased costs after contract formation. This case once
again provided the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to address its
case law on "bad faith" in the context of an allegation of a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
i.

Background

Lakeshore Engineering Services, Inc. ("Lakeshore") entered into
an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract with the
U.S. Army Contracting Agency for repair, maintenance, and
construction services at Fort Rucker, Alabama.'2 6 The solicitation
stated that the Army would place separate job orders with the
awardee based on pricing that the parties would calculate by the
identified costs for those jobs, multiplied by certain "coefficients" set
in the contract.'2 7 The identified costs were based on unit prices
found in the Universal Unit Price Book (UUPB). 128 The government
advised offerors to set their coefficients to represent "costs (generally
indirect costs) not considered to be included in the [UUPB] prices"
and to "contain all costs other than the prepriced unit prices, as no
allowance [would] be made after award."' 29 The solicitation further
enumerated factors that offerors needed to include in their
coefficients, including "[o]ther risks of doing business (i.e., risk of a

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

748 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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lower than expected contract dollar value; risk of poor subcontractor
performance and re-performance).""'

After performing on the contract for two years, Lakeshore
unsuccessfully requested an equitable adjustment of contract prices
because its incurred costs exceeded its payments from the
government."'
Lakeshore claimed that it was encountering
"extraordinary inflationary circumstances" and complained of
extremely high local prices as a result of Hurricane Katrina.'32
Lakeshore then sought relief in the COFC, alleging, among other
claims, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and mistake. l3 The COFC granted the government's
motion for summary judgment, finding that Lakeshore had not
identified enough evidence that, even if credited, would allow it to
prevail at trial.'34
ii.

The Federal Circuitdecision

(a) Breach of contract
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC's rejection of Lakeshore's
principal breach of contract claim, which was based on the argument
that the unit prices that the government was paying Lakeshore were
not accurate at the time the parties entered into the contract.3 5 The
court determined that "the only reasonable conclusion on the
evidence here [was] that any risk that the prices in the UUPB were
inaccurate at the time of contracting [were] borne by Lakeshore."' 6
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that nothing in the contractual
language guaranteed the accurateness of the prices in the UUPB or
put the government at any risk if those prices were later determined
to be inaccurate. 37 Moreover, the solicitation provided for task
orders for a "Firm Fixed-Price" contract.3l'

130.
131.
132.
(2013),
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

As the court explained,

Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1345.
Lakeshore Eng'g Servs., Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 230, 237-38
affd, 748 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 237.
LakeshoreEng'gServs., 748 F.3d at 1345.
Id.
Id.at 1347.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"[t]he essence of a firm fixed-price contract is that the contractor,
1 39
not the government, assumes the risk of unexpected costs.'

In addition, the Federal Circuit found that Lakeshore's actions
showed that it understood that it was responsible for ensuring the
accuracy of the UUPB unit prices and setting its coefficients. After
all, Lakeshore had (1) reviewed the UUPB and compared major line
items with its actual experience on past projects, (2) discussed pricing
with the prior contractor, and (3) reflected that it was not relying on
the accuracy of the UUPB pricing by adjusting its principal
coefficients 6% above ordinary levels. 4 '
The court also determined that Lakeshore's second argumentthat the government's "refusal to allow equitable adjustments for
inflation of costs that occurred after the contract was made"failed. 4 ' The court explained that "[ilt is a necessary condition for
an adjustment under the FAR provision that the increased contractor
cost be the result of a change to the contract made by the
government.' 1 42 Here, Lakeshore's claim was not based on any such

government change to the contract.

43

(b) Covenant of goodfaith andfair dealing
The court also agreed with the COFC that Lakeshore could not
establish that the government breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 44 Lakeshore had entered into a fixed-price contract
that established "that the contractor, not the government, would bear
the risk of any inaccuracy in the pre-contract prices used for
bidding... and of post-contract changes in market prices for the
contractor's inputs beyond those covered by the contract's specific
price-adjustment clauses."' 145 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that
Lakeshore got what it bargained for: payment based on UUPB unit
prices multiplied by the contractor's bid coefficients and adjusted by
46
limited post-contract changes.

139. Id. (citing United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918); 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.202-1 (2014)).
140. Id. at 1347-48.
141. Id. at 1348.
142. Id. (citing Int'l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
143. Id.

144. Id.
at 1349.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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(c) Significance
With regard to the Federal Circuit's significant clarification in
Metcalf, Lakeshore addresses the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, but it does nothing to either support or contradict the
ruling that "bad faith" is not required to prevail. Instead, the
Federal Circuit in Lakeshore focused on the allocation of risk
between the government and Lakeshore and found repeatedly that
Lakeshore bore the risk. The court's language could be argued to
be another example of the formalism commentators have criticized
and seen in Bell/Heery.
However, in Lakeshore, this formalistic result may be less susceptible
to a charge of unfairness. It appears that the increased local pricing
of which Lakeshore complained was tied to Hurricane Katrina.
However, Lakeshore submitted its proposal in March 2007147m-fifteen
months after Hurricane Katrina impacted the Gulf Coast. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit noted that "at the time of the government's
solicitation and Lakeshore's review in preparing its bid, it was well
known that construction costs in the region of Fort Rucker had
increased in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina." 4 ' In short, where
the government and the contractor are both aware of increased costs
and the risk created by them, the Federal Circuit's decision to hold
the contractor to its obligation to bear the risk of cost increases would
seem less vulnerable to allegations of inequitableness or unfairness.
2.

Contractformation and interpretation
This subsection analyzes four cases that address issues of contract
formation and interpretation that do not otherwise fit within one of
the other categories (such as oil and gas cases). Moreover, each of
these cases is primarily concerned with whether and to what extent
the government is obligated to pay the contractor for its actions. In
Estes Express Lines v. United States,149 the Federal Circuit found the
government obliged to pay a subcontractor even where the
government had formally entered into a contract with another entity.
In other words, the court specifically found the government liable by
looking beyond a formal review of the contract at issue. The court
reached the opposite conclusion-that the government had no

147. Lakeshore Eng'g Servs., Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. C1. 230, 236 (2013),
affd, 748 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
148. LakeshoreEng'gServs., 748 F.3d at 1344.
149. 739 F.3d 689 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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obligation to pay-in Crewzers Fire Crew Transport, Inc. v. United
States, 50 where the court again affirmed the principal that a Blanket
Purchase Agreement is not a contract.
In the remaining two cases, In re Nwogu15 1 and Nichole Medical
Equipment & Supply, Inc. v. United States,1 52 the Federal Circuit
addressed whether the government had an obligation to pay the
contractor for the government's actions during performance of the
contract. For In re Nwogu, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
government was obligated to pay and that the COFC was wrong not
to enforce that determination. In Nichole Medical, the court held that
the government had not breached its agreement with the plaintiff
and was not obligated to pay.
a. Estes Express Lines v. United States
Where the Bell/Heery case may be claimed as an example of the
formalistic approach that has generated extensive criticism of the
Federal Circuit, the court's decision in Estes Express is at the opposite
end of the spectrum. In Estes Express, the Federal Circuit took a
wider view of the facts and determined that it could still find privity
of contract by looking beyond the four corners of a formal
government contract.
i.

Background

Estes Express involved an appeal from a motor carrier that sought to
recover from the Marine Corps Community Services ("MCCS")
freight charges incurred for shipments arranged on behalf of MCCS
by a freight broker, Salem Logistics ("Salem")."' Salem and MCCS
had entered into a contract wherein "Salem agreed to provide MCCS
with certain transportation and freight management services,
including coordinating the pick-up, transport and delivery of vendor
products to various MCCS or Marine Corps Exchange ('MCX')
locations." ' 4 Under the contract, Salem would select a carrier-one
of which was Estes Express Lines ("Estes")-to move merchandise
from the vendor to the MCCS or MCX destination, pay the carrier
directly, and invoice MCCS.1
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

55

The contract specified that bills of

741 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
570 F. App'x 919 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
558 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Estes Express Lines, 739 F.3d at 691.
Id.
Id.
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lading indicate that "'third party freight charges' were to be billed to
'Marine Corps Exchange C/O Salem Logistics,"' that delivery receipts
must be signed by a representative of the MCCS or MCX delivery
locations, and that MCX should be billed.1 56 Pursuant to this
arrangement, shipments "handled by Estes [were] identified by a bill
of lading, a freight bill, and a delivery receipt," and "Estes invoiced
1
'MCX, care of Salem' for freight charges.

57

Although MCCS paid Salem for shipments, Salem apparently did
not remit all required payments to Estes for the shipments Estes
handled.1 5
When MCCS became aware of this, it began paying
carriers directly but only for subsequent shipments. 59 Estes sued
Salem and the government in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, seeking to recover earlier freight
charges.1" The case was transferred to the COFC, which dismissed
Estes's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after finding
no direct privity of contract between Estes and the government and
rejected Estes's claim under 49 U.S.C. § 13706 regarding the liability
16
of consignees for shipping. 1
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the CFOC, finding that the bills
of lading were sufficient to establish privity and thus jurisdiction.'6 2
Reviewing the question of jurisdiction de novo, the Federal Circuit
examined the specific language of the bills of lading and found that
"MCCS intended to be bound by bills of lading that would
reflect... that it was.., the party ultimately responsible for freight
charges."'63 Based on the facts at hand, as well as the rule that "a
party to the shipment may assume liability where the terms of the
bill of lading so provide and the party accepts the shipment subject
to the terms of the bill of lading," the court found the bills of lading
satisfied Estes's burden to show privity."6 The court considered that
MCCS had "expressly authorized, by contract, its designation as a

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693-94.
Id.
Id.
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party to the bills of lading," that "MCX accepted all shipments
without exception, and that a MCX representative signed each
delivery receipt listing MCX as the 'bill to' party."165 Accordingly,
the court reversed and remanded.'66
iii. Significance
The Federal Circuit in Estes Express looked beyond the four corners
of the contract at issue and found a solution that appeared to
equitably resolve the dispute. As mentioned above, the history of the
action gave the Federal Circuit an opportunity to deny the
contractor's claim-namely, that the court lacked jurisdiction because
the plaintiff had not entered into a contract with the government.'6 7
However, the Federal Circuit ruled in a way that would be at odds
with commentators' assertions that the court is too formalistic.
More broadly, the court in Estes Express clarified the scope of
federal jurisdiction over contract claims. Privity of contract need not
be explicitly stated in the underlying contract with the federal
government. 168 Such contracts must be read in context with other
related ancillary documents, such as bills of lading. 6 9 Just because
the plaintiff is not a party to the underlying contract does not
foreclose the existence of a separate contractual relationship between
that person or entity and the government based on bills of lading or
other ancillary agreements.
b.

Crewzers Fire Crew Transport, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit's decision in Crewzers is part of a consistent line
of cases concluding that blanket purchase agreements ("BPAs") and
similar arrangements where neither party is obligated are not subject
170
to the Tucker Act.

165. Id.at 693.
166. Id. at 694. The Federal Circuit declined to decide the question of "whether
the Government may be liable for freight charges solely on the basis that it is the
consignee and owner of the freight." Id.
167. See id. at 693 (explaining that Estes was a subcontractor with Salem rather

than a government contractor).
168. See id. (concluding that the government intended to be bound by bills of
lading even though it had not contracted with Estes).
169. See id. at 693--94 (explaining that bills of lading can show privity with the

government even though they are not part of a government contract itself).
170. See, e.g.,
Ridge Runner Forestry v. Veneman, 287 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (tender agreements); Modern Sys. Tech. Corp. v. United States, 979 F.2d 200,
206 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (BPAs).
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i.

Background

The U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service) awarded two BPAs to
Crewzers Fire Crew Transport, Inc. ("Crewzers")--one to provide
crew carrier buses to the Forest Service to transport fire crews to
wildfires and other disaster areas and a second to provide flame
retardant tents to disaster areas as needed. 7 ' The Forest Service
awarded these BPAs to multiple contractors for each set of goods."7 2
The Forest Service ranked the contractors by cost in each of the six
Forest Service geographic regions and then contacted the top-ranked
contractor to contract for services for the emergency at hand. 7 ' If
the top-ranked contractor chose to accept the offer, a contract was
formed.'7 4 If that contractor declined the offer, if the Forest Service
could not reach the contractor, or if the contractor could not provide
the service in question, the Forest Service could move on to the next
contractor on the list.'75 Finally, the Forest Service could deviate
from the priority list as needed to respond effectively to actual fire
conditions and without violating the BPA.176 Crewzers's BPA also
specifically provided (1) that Crewzers only had to furnish resources
to the extent that it was willing and able at the time of order and (2)
that because incidents were sporadic and unforeseeable, there was no
guarantee that the Fire Service would place any orders at all.' 77
In August 2011, the Forest Service terminated Crewzers's BPA for
carrier buses after Crewzers accepted several orders despite having
non-regulation vehicles and then attempted to bill the Forest Service
for costs above the authorized rate.'7 8 In November 2011, the Forest
Service terminated Crewzers's BPA for flame retardant tents because
Crewzers had provided the tents late and against specifications.' 79
Crewzers sued the Forest Service in the COFC for breach of each
contract.' The COFC granted the government's motions to dismiss

171. Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., Inc. v. United States, 741 F.3d 1380, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
172. Id.

173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1382.

179. Id.
180. Id.
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for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act 8' because the BPAs
lacked the mutuality of consideration required for a contract to be
83
82
enforceable and, therefore, were not binding.' Crewzers appealed.
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision

The Federal Circuit found that Crewzers had not sufficiently pled
that the BPAs at issue were binding contracts. 184 The court noted that
for a contract to be enforceable, it must have both consideration and
mutuality of obligation.'85 The court also explained that a promise is
not valid consideration when its terms dictate that the "promisor
reserves a choice of alternative performances ... .
Under the
BPAs, the Forest Service was not required to place any orders with
Crewzers.' 8 7 In fact, the BPAs allowed the Forest Service to deviate
from the priority list in order to adequately address needs in a
disaster situation.'88 Similarly, the BPAs did not require any specific
performance from Crewzers: upon offer from the Forest Service,
Crewzers was not obligated to accept the contract, and if it did, the
BPA permitted the company to fulfill the contract to the extent it was
"willing and able."' 89
Accordingly, the BPAs reflected illusory
promises that imposed no enforceable obligations on either party."'
Finding such contracts to be non-enforceable, the Federal Circuit
upheld the trial court's dismissal.'
iii. Significance
The Federal Circuit's decision in Crewzers is consistent with a line of
cases that find that BPAs and similar arrangements where neither
party is contractually obligated to perform are not binding contracts
under the Tucker Act.' 92 Because such arrangements do not qualify

181. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (a) (2012)).
182. Crewzers, 741 F.3d at 1382.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 (1981)).
187. Id. at 1384.
188. Id.
189. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
190. Id. at 1382-83.
191. Id. at 1384-85.
192. See, e.g., Ridge Runner Forestry v. Veneman, 287 F.3d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (concluding that the tenders agreement at issue were unenforceable because
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as binding contracts, the COFC lacks jurisdiction to address claims of
breaches thereof.

c.

193

In re Nwogu
i.

Background

This dispute arose out of two contracts awarded to the petitioner,
Peter C. Nwogu, doing business as Environmental Safety Consultants,
Inc. ("ESCI"). 9"
ESCI asked the COFC to enforce the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) judgment against the
government for $93,989 plus interest related to a contract to remove,
transport, and dispose of industrial waste sludge from the Naval
9
Centers in Warminster, Pennsylvania ("Contract I").
The
government moved to dismiss, arguing that the COFC lacked
jurisdiction over ESCI's various claims regarding Contract I and that
the government had a right of setoff based on damages owed to it
under a separate contract to remove storage tanks in Yorktown,
Virginia ("Contract II"). 1' The COFC granted the government's
motion based on the right of setoff.'97
ESCI appealed to the Federal Circuit. "98 The Federal Circuit
vacated the dismissal because the ASBCA had already reviewed the
termination of Contract II and decided to convert the termination
from a default termination to one of convenience. 99 Additionally,
the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC's decision that it did not
have jurisdiction to order payment of the ASBCA judgment. 20 The
Federal Circuit remanded for enforcement of the $93,989 award
21
plus interest.
On remand, the government asserted that four ASBCA
proceedings were pending that could impact ESCI's recovery under
Contract II, which, in turn, could affect a setoff against the award for

they did not limit the promisor's future behavior); Modern Sys. Tech. Corp. v.
United States, 979 F.2d 200, 206 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a BPA was not
binding because it did not contain a minimum quantity provision).
193. Crewzers, 741 F.3d at 1384-85.
194. In re Nwogu, 570 F. App'x 919, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
195. Id. at 920.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.

201. Id.
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Contract 2°2 The COFC stayed the remand proceedings pending
resolution of those ASBCA matters.2"'
"ESCI moved for
reconsideration, asserting that the [Federal Circuit's] mandate
required the [COFC] to enter the judgment in its favor." 2 4 After the
COFC failed to act on its motion for four months, ESCI filed a
petition in the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.2 5
ii. The FederalCircuit decision
In a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit explained that, in its earlier
remand decision, the court had held that Contract II was not in
default, ordered payment of the judgment on Contract I, and "did
not invite further delay, or new issues, or additional reasons not to
pay the judgment awarded in 2005" on Contract 1.206 Further, "[b]y
vacating the decision that the Government could properly withhold
payment, [the Federal Circuit's] mandate precluded the [COFC]
'
from staying payment. " 27
The government argued "that a stay of all proceedings [was]
appropriate pending disposition of the four ASBCA actions."2 8
However, the government later conceded that it considered only one
of those actions to be pending.2 9 Additionally, the government did
not "show[] that it [was] in a position to collect any monetary
damages from ESCI in the ASBCA appeals. '2 0 The court noted that
none of the ASBCA matters appeared to involve any claim for setoff
by the government. 21' In fact, the only claims pending before the
ASBCA were claims by ESCI, not against ESCI.212 Judge Wallach
dissented, arguing that because the Federal Circuit did not finally
resolve the enforcement claim, the mandate rule did not entitle the
213
petitioner to a final judgment.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 921.
Id. at922.
Id. at920-21.
Id. at 922 (Wallach,J., dissenting).
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iii. Significance
This case articulates some limits concerning when the COFC can
delay taking the steps required in a remand decision. Because this
scenario does not frequently arise, it is not clear how instructive this
decision can be. In fact, considering that this case involved a lower
court-the COFC-that essentially refused to take the action directed
by the Federal Circuit, it can be interpreted as resolving a dispute
between courts as much as resolving a dispute between litigants.
d. Nichole Medical Equipment & Supply, Inc. v. United States
Nichole Medical is a non-precedential decision in a case brought by a
pro se plaintiff-appellant.
i.

Background
In 2004, as a result of a search of the Medicare records of Nichole
Medical Equipment & Supply, Inc. ("Nichole"), a program safeguard
contractor for the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS)
directed a payment intermediary to withhold approximately $101,000
due to Nichole because CMS suspected Nichole had committed fraud
in the supply of wheelchairs and hospital beds ("wheelchair/bed
issue").24
The payment intermediary imposed the offset but
immediately stayed it.215
In January 2006, the government and Nichole entered into a
settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement") on a matter
unrelated to the wheelchair/bed issue. 16 The government alleged
that Nichole had knowingly submitted false and fraudulent payment
requests to Medicare and Medicaid for incontinence supplies.217
Under the Settlement Agreement, Nichole agreed to pay the
government $750,000 in installments and also agreed that, upon
default without cure, the government could offset any remaining
balance from any amounts the government owed Nichole.1 8 Nichole
soon defaulted on its obligations under the Settlement Agreement.2 19
It made an initial payment and the first two monthly payments before
214. Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 328, 330
(2013), affd, 558 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. United States, 558 F. App'x 1001, 1002
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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stopping payments in the spring of 2006, leaving a balance of more
than $577,350.221

In July 2006, a new payment intermediary reinstituted the offset on
the wheelchair/bed issue.22 ' Nichole "allege [d] that reimposition of
the wheelchair/bed offset caused plaintiffs to be unable to pay the
[Settlement Agreement] balance, leading to its cessation of
operations in January 2007. "222 In 2008, a Medicare administrative
law judge found for Nichole that the wheelchair/bed offset was
improper because the government had failed to comply with
Medicare regulations regarding notice requirements and timing
limitations for reopening claims. 223 However, since Nichole was still
in default of the Settlement Agreement, the government instructed
the intermediary not to reimburse Nichole the approximately
$101,000 from the earlier wheelchair/bed issue.224
Nichole and its owner, Dominic Rotella, alleged that the
government breached the Settlement Agreement. 225 The plaintiffs
alleged that the government's failure to comply with the then-current
Medicare regulations regarding notice requirements and timing
limitations for reopening claims violated the Settlement Agreement
because the agreement stated that it would be "governed by the laws
226
of the United States.
The COFC disagreed with the plaintiffs and found that the
language at issue-that the Settlement Agreement would be
"governed by the laws of the United States"-was a common choice of
law provision that said nothing about how the government would
conduct future dealings with Nichole.227 Further, even if this
language did require the government and its intermediaries to follow

220. Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc., 109 Fed. Cl. at 332.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 332-33. The Administrative Law Judge based his decision on two
Medicare regulations. The first, 42 C.F.R. § 405.841(a)-(c), provided that an initial
payment decision could be reopened either (1) within a year of official notice or (2)
if good cause is shown why the claim should be reopened after a year but within four
years as well as that a contractor could reopen a claim for review at any time when
evidence of fraud existed. Id. at 332 n.6 (citation omitted). The second, 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.842(a), required that Nichole receive written notice if its past claims for
reimbursement were to be reopened. Id. at 332.
224. NicholeMed. Equip. &Supply, Inc., 558 F. App'x at 1002.
225. Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc., 109 Fed. Cl. at 333.
226. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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applicable Medicare laws and regulations, Nichole was not entitled to
forgo its legal obligations under the Settlement Agreement, as
Nichole claimed. 22 ' The COFC also explained that the "warranty as
envisioned by plaintiffs would be inconsistent with other provisions of
the [Settlement Agreement, which] specifically reserved claims of the
United States that were based on conduct other than" that relating to
the incontinence supplies. 229 The trial court subsequently dismissed
the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.8 0
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision

Rotella, who appealed the case on his own,231 argued on appeal
that the Settlement Agreement obligated the government to comply
with Medicare law and that Nichole could have plausibly
understood the Settlement Agreement and incorporated documents
to have resolved all prior payment actions, including the
2
wheelchair/bed issue. 1

2

The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments, finding that the
Settlement Agreement and incorporated documents required only
Nichole, not the government, to comply with Medicare law.2 3
Rotella's argument that this interpretation was unfair failed because
the issue was "whether [Rotella] plausibly alleged that there [was] a
contractual obligation for the Government's future activities to
comply with Medicare
law, not whether it was fair for there to be no
234
such obligation.

The court also found that Rotella did not plausibly allege that the
Settlement Agreement resolved all past disputes. 235 Like the COFC,
the Federal Circuit found that the express terms of the Settlement
Agreement showed that it resolved only those allegations related to
the incontinence supplies action and not to the wheelchair/bed
228. Id.
229. Id. at 335.
230. Id.
231. Nichole Med. Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. United States, 558 F. App'x 1001, 1003
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ("Since the filing of this appeal, Counsel for
Appellants has withdrawn and Nichole Medical Equipment & Supply, Inc., as an
unrepresented corporation, has been removed from this appeal.
Rotella is

proceeding pro se.").
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

235. Id.
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action.236 In addition, even if Nichole believed that the Settlement
Agreement resolved all of its past problems, such a unilateral
understanding was insufficient to support this claim because the
237
subjective unexpressed intent of one party to a contract is irrelevant.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the COFC.238
iii. Significance
The Federal Circuit's decision that Nichole had defaulted on its
obligations under the Settlement Agreement in the spring of 2006
before the government reimposed the offset of the wheelchair/bed
issue in July 2006 means that the government's subsequent conducteven if in violation of the Medicare laws-does not appear relevant.
Nichole Medical also contains dicta that could be read to imply that
the government does not have an obligation to comply with Medicare
laws. Specifically, the court stated that "the Integrity Agreement only
impose[d] an obligation on Nichole-and not the Government-to
comply with Medicare law. '2 9 It would be interesting to see how
different facts-for instance had Nichole defaulted only on its
payments under the Settlement Agreement after the government
violated the Medicare regulations and deprived Nichole of revenue
that it was due-would have impacted the Federal Circuit's decision.
3.

Cost reimbursement
The Federal Circuit decided three cost-reimbursement contracting
cases in 2014, and each provided some welcome guidance. Perhaps
the most significant of the group was the court's decision in Sikorsky
Aircraft Corp. v. United States,240 which clarified that the statute of
limitations under the Contract Disputes Act is notjurisdictional. The
other two decisions, Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United
States 4 ' and Raytheon Co. v. United States,242 are both instances where
the court deferred to the determinations of the COFC on
complicated cost accounting issues. In particular, in Raytheon, the

236. Id.
237. Id. at 1003-04.
238. Id. at 1004.
239. Id. at 1003 (explaining that it is "irrelevant" whether it is "unfair" to consider
the agreement as not requiring the government to comply with Medicare law).
240. 773 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
241. 742 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
242. 747 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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court confirmed that the government bears the burden of proof in
showing that a contractor's accounting practices are improper.
a. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States
The Federal Circuit's decision in Kellogg Brown & Root addressed
cost-reimbursement contracting in the midst of a war zone. 243 The
court's decision left Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. ("KBR")
with substantial losses.

44

However, in arriving at that result, the court

avoided the formalism that critics have questioned and, instead, took
into account the particularities of the circumstances in the case.
i.

Background

KBR contracted with the U.S. Army to provide logistical support
services during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 4 5 Under the contract,
KBR would provide services through individual task orders (TO).246
KBR sued the United States, seeking to recover $12,529,504 in costs
incurred under two TOs that "required KBR to provide, install,
2 47
operate, and maintain dining facility services near Mosul, Iraq.)
The relevant TOs provided that the Army would compensate KBR
on a cost-plus-award-fee basis. 248 KBR subcontracted with ABC
International Group ("ABC") to build a "Kirby-style" dining facility
and to provide dining services for 2573 individuals. 249 ABC originally
quoted a total monthly cost of $869,735 for 2501 to 3500 individuals.250
In June 2004, the Army told KBR to stop constructing the Kirbystyle facility and asked KBR to instead begin constructing a concretereinforced facility for upwards of 6200 troops.2 5 1 ABC then submitted
a new proposal for constructing such a facility to KBR; ABC proposed

243. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 742 F.3d at 968.
244. KBR originally sued in the Court of Federal Claims to recover about $12.5
million in costs incurred in meeting the government's requirements but was only
allowed to recover $6.8 million. Id. at 970.
245. Id. at 968.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. In a cost-plus-fee award contract, the contractor is paid for "all allowable
costs incurred" while performing the contract "plus an additional fee based upon the
contractor's performance." Id. at 968 n.1.
249. Id. at 968-69. "Kirby-style" refers to the use of prefabricated metal structures.

Id. at 968.
250. Id. at 969.
251. Id.
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a monthly cost of $2,706,600 for 5501 to 6500 individuals 2 2-about
three times the cost originally quoted for the Kirby-style facility.
KBR's Subcontract Administrator Team Leader reviewed the
proposal and created a price negotiation memorandum to assess the
reasonableness of ABC's quote. 25'

The memorandum included a

benchmark against which to assess the new proposal for
reasonableness, but KBR made an error that set the benchmark four
times higher than it should have been.254 KBR management reviewed
the proposal with this flawed memorandum and approved ABC's cost
increase as reasonable.

255

In 2007, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA)
suspended the government's reimbursement of KBR for costs paid to
ABC pursuant to the second proposal.25 6 In the end, DCAA refused
to reimburse KBR for the $12,529,504 that KBR had paid ABC.257
KBR sued the government in the COFC to recover the
$12,529,504.25 8 The COFC found for the government, holding that
KBR did not sufficiently show that the incurred costs were
reasonable.2 59 The trial court found that KBR failed to employ sound
business practices and did not act prudently in accepting ABC's
2 60
proposed costs.
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision
261
On appeal, KBR argued that the FAR's reasonableness standard
encompasses a "broad range of reasonableness" and that "all costs
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

261. Pursuant to the FAR, a cost is reasonable when "in its nature and amount, it
does not exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of
competitive business." FAR 31.201-3(a) (2014). Reasonableness is assessed using the
following four fact specific factors:
(1) Whether it is the type of cost generally recognized as ordinary and necessary
for the conduct of the contractor's business or the contract performance;
(2) Generally accepted sound business practices, arm's length bargaining, and
Federal and State laws and regulations;
(3) The contractor's responsibilities to the Government, other customers,
the owners of the business, employees, and the public at large; and
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associated with a cost-reimbursement contract are reasonable unless
they arise out of willful misconduct, gross negligence, or gross
The Federal Circuit
disregard of contractual obligations. 26 2
reasoned that it did not need to decide how broad the
reasonableness standard is in relation to negligent conduct in the
performance of cost-reimbursement contracts because the COFC had
already determined that KBR's conduct was, in fact, grossly
negligent. 26 3 While the Federal Circuit did not explicitly articulate
that cost is always unreasonable where the cost-incurring conduct is
grossly negligent, it did affirm that KBR's price negotiation
memorandum was "seriously flawed, [and that] KBR's management
was aware of the inadequacies of the Memorandum and still
approved the Change Order 1 without questioning the higher
costs. ' 264 The Federal Circuit found that there was no clear error in

the COFC's determination that KBR failed to show "that it
employed sound business practices and acted as a reasonably prudent
business person."265

KBR further argued that decisions made in a war zone during a
time of conflict cannot be examined in the same light as ones made
in less volatile circumstances. 266 The court agreed but noted that
"reasonableness" inherently accounts for unusual situations because
the behavior must be examined under the specific circumstances that
existed at the time at issue. 26 ' The court then concluded that a
reasonably prudent businessperson would still not have behaved as
KBR did in this situation.26 8
iii. Significance
While not the result that the contractor wanted, the court's
decision does not display the hallmarks of formalism with which
Professor Nash was concerned. The court did not resolve the case
(4) Any significant deviations from the contractor's established practices.
Id. at 31.201-3(b).
262. KelloggBrown, 742 F.3d at 971 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id. (arguing that the urgency of the government's request, combined with
the dangerousness of the situation in Iraq, "bear[ed] on the reasonableness" of the
contract terms (internal quotation marks omitted)).
267. Id. (explaining that the situation in Iraq was "certainly relevant" but not
sufficient for determining that KBR acted as a reasonably prudent businessperson).
268. Id.
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using an arbitrary rule that ignored factual nuances.26 9 In fact, the
Federal Circuit made its determination based on the specific factual
nuances presented by the war zone.27 °
Moreover, rather than ignore the findings of the trial court,2 71 the
Federal Circuit's decision expressly relied upon the COFC's finding
that "KBR was grossly negligent. 2 72 Finally, this decision does not
appear to reveal a "desire to impose more rigorous standards" on the
government contract community.273 Rather, the court essentially
directed the contracting community to determine reasonableness by
evaluating individual circumstances by emphasizing that "the
reasonableness standard isflexible... [and] must be examined under
the circumstances that existed at the time the cost was incurred, but
such business judgment must still be exercised in a rational manner,
274
even in wartime.
b. Raytheon Co. v. United States
In Raytheon Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision from the
COFC requiring the government to pay Raytheon Co. ("Raytheon")
approximately $59.2 million for pension fund adjustments made
pursuant to Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 413.27' The dispute on
appeal centered on the government's obligation to pay Raytheon
segment closing adjustments for pension deficits concerning several
276
businesses Raytheon sold during a corporate restructuring.

269. Professor Nash has argued that the "dogmatic application of a strict legal
rule" in government contract cases "can lead to unfair results." Nash, supra note 4,
at 612-13.
270. See Kellogg Brown, 742 F.3d at 972 ("Wile the circumstances surrounding
negotiations are certainly relevant, KBR still had the burden to show that a prudent
businessperson would have accepted ABC's prices under those circumstances."
(emphasis added)).
271. See Nash, supra note 4, at 613 (offering the Federal Circuit's possible
"mistrust of trial judges" as a reason for its line of cases using plain language
contract interpretation).
272. Kellogg Brown, 742 F.3d at971.
273. Nash, supranote 4, at 614.
274. Kellogg Brown, 742 F.3d at 972 (emphasis added).
275. Raytheon Co. v. United States, 747 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see 48
C.F.R. § 9904.413-40 (2014) ("Contractors shall allocate pension cost to each
segment having participants in a pension plan.").
276. Raytheon Co., 747 F.3d at 1344-45.
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i.

Background

In the early 2000s, Raytheon sold eight business segments that
performed government contracts as part of a major corporate
reorganization. 27 7 As part of this process, Raytheon calculated
segment closing adjustments pursuant to CAS, including adjustments
related to the defined benefit pension plans associated with the
segments Raytheon sold. 278 For some of those segments, Raytheon
calculated a pension surplus and paid the government its share of
those surpluses. 279 However, for four segments, Raytheon calculated
pension deficits and submitted certified claims to recover the
government's share of the deficits. 2"° The contracting officer rejected
the claim under the theory that Raytheon had not complied with
CAS 413.281

Raytheon sued the government under the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA) and sought to reverse the contracting officer's decision.282
million for
The COFC ruled that Raytheon could recover about $59.2
283
the claims related to two of the four Raytheon segments.
ii.

The Federal Circuitdecision

The Federal Circuit affirmed all aspects of the COFC's decision,
specifically rejecting the government's three arguments on appeal.2 84
(a) Segment closing adjustments are not "pension costs"
Directly on the substance of the CAS rules on pension costs, the
court rejected the government's primary argument that "segment
closing adjustments" constituted "pension costs" and thus were
subject to the timely funding requirement of FAR 31.205-6(j).285 The
court asserted three reasons for taking this position. First, the court
noted that CAS 412286 and 413 do not treat segment closing
277. Id. at 1344.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1344-45.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1345.
282. Id. at 1347.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1357. Raytheon also cross-appealed the trial court's decision denying
recovery for one of the business segments. Id. at 1355. The Federal Circuit affirmed
this decision as well, thus determining that Raytheon was not entitled to pension
closing adjustments for that business segment. Id.

285. Id. at 1349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. See48 C.F.R. § 9904.412 (2014).
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adjustments as pension costs; indeed, such adjustments are not listed
as a component of "pension costs," which CAS 412 describes in
detail.28 7 The preamble to CAS 413 also treats segment closing
adjustments differently and provides that such28 costs are "not an
actuarial gain or loss as defined in the Standard."
Second, the court rejected the government's claim that the FAR's
cost principles trumped the CAS provisions on this point. 29 Instead,
the court explained that while the FAR governs allowability, the CAS
has authority over "measurement of cost," which includes the ability
to define "the components of a pension cost. ' 290 The court also
reiterated its prior holding that "if there is any conflict between the
CAS and the FAR as to an issue of allocability, the CAS governs. "291
Third, the court held that the text of FAR 31.205-6(j) itself
recognizes the distinction between pension costs and segment closing
adjustments. 2 2 According to the court, the provision does not
suggest that segment closing adjustments are subject to the timely
funding requirement, and the provision also references CAS 412 and
pension
413 in order to determine how the costs for defined-benefit
29 3
for.
accounted
and
allocated,
plans must be "measured,
(b) The government bears the burden ofproving
noncompliancewith CAS
The Federal Circuit also rejected the government's argument that
Raytheon should have had the burden of proving that it complied
with the CAS because it was affirmatively seeking compensation from
the government. 2 4 The Federal Circuit had not previously addressed
this issue, but it noted that the ASBCA and the COFC have, for years,
"determined that the Government bears the burden of proving that29a5
contractor's accounting practices do not comply with the CAS."
The court called the government's argument that Raytheon was
affirmatively alleging CAS noncompliance by the government
287. Raytheon Co., 747 F.3d at 1349.
288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. Id. at 1350.
290. Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 9903.302-1 (a)).
291. Id. (quoting Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Roche, 298 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
292. Id. at 1351.
293. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1352 (citing Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 210,
34,787; Unisys
219 (2013); Gen. Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 56744, 11-2 BCA
Corp., ASBCA No. 41135, 94-2 BCA

26,894)).
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"dubious."296 Rather, Raytheon was challenging the contracting
officer's decision, which alleged that Raytheon had not complied
with CAS." Therefore, the court held that the "Government bears
the burden to prove that a contractor's segment closing adjustment
does not comply with the CAS, even if the adjustment is asserted in a
claim brought by the contractor. "298
(c)

The government cannot request an equitable adjustment
without submitting a claim

Finally, the court rejected the government's request for an
equitable adjustment, which the government claimed at trial was
required to account for pension contributions made in 1995 and
prior to revisions to CAS 413.299 Just as the trial court had held, the
court explained that the "equitable adjustment" the government
sought was "separate and distinct from the calculation of a segment
closing adjustment required by CAS 413. "13o0 Because it was not part
of this calculation, the adjustment the government sought constituted
a "separate claim under the Contract Disputes Act subject to a written
decision by the contracting officer."3'1 The contracting officer did
not make a decision on this adjustment, so the court upheld the trial
court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue. 0 2
iii. Significance

Raytheon does not fit into the category of cases that Professor Nash
described as demonstrating the Federal Circuit's "mistrust of trial
judges."0 ' Rather, in a case that was very much about the minutia of
the CAS and FAR pension cost rules, the Federal Circuit effectively
deferred to the COFC's decision on those technical accounting issues.
Raytheon also provides guidance outside of the issue of pension
costs, including (1) clarifying that the government has the burden of
proof to show that the contractor's accounting practices do not
comply with the FAR, (2) indicating that the CAS trumps the FAR
with regard to allocability, and (3) determining that the government
296. Id.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.at 1353.
Id.
Id.

301.
302.

Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1354-55.

303. Nash, supra note 4, at 613.
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cannot seek an "equitable adjustment" on a separate distinct
calculation for which it has not filed its own claim." 4
c. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States
The court in Sikorsky addressed Cost Accounting Standards and the
statute of limitations for contract disputes.
i. Background
Prior to 1999, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation ("Sikorsky") allocated
its materiel overhead costs, which included the indirect costs of
purchasing and handling materiel that Sikorsky used to
manufacture and assemble aircraft and parts, by using an allocation
base of direct materiel costs less certain costs incurred for
commercial contracts." 5 Sikorsky subtracted these commercial costs
in order to compensate for the exclusion of government furnished
material ("GFM") from the direct materiel cost base. 0 6 However,
Sikorsky later determined that this base did not adequately
compensate for the distortions in the government's favor caused by
excluding GFM from direct materiel costs. 307 As a result, effective
January 1, 1999 through 2005, Sikorsky used a new method that
allocated its materiel overhead costs to government cost objectives
using a direct labor base. °8 Under this method, Sikorsky allocated
its materiel overhead costs in proportion to the direct labor costs
consumed by each cost objective on each contract' °
The contracting officer determined that Sikorsky was liable for
approximately $65 million in principal and $15 million in interest for
noncompliance with CAS 418 between 1999 and 2005.'
Sikorsky
filed two suits in the COFC challenging the government's claim,
which were later consolidated.'
The COFC ultimately granted
judgment in favor of Sikorsky, although it rejected Sikorsky's statute
304. Raytheon Co., 747 F.3d at 1350-51, 1354-55.
305. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. Although Sikorsky maintained that the old method complied with CAS, it
changed its method effective January 1, 2006 to allocate purchasing costs according
to a base of direct materiel costs minus the costs of commercial aircraft engines and
continued to allocate materiel-handling costs according to a direct labor base. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 210, 213 n.5 (2013), affd
in part, dismissed in part, 773 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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of limitations defense.1 2 The COFC determined that the statute of
limitations under the CDA313 was an affirmative defense, and,
therefore, that Sikorsky had the burden of proof to show that the
government had actual or constructive knowledge of a potential
claim more than six years before the government submitted its claim
to Sikorsky." 4 The COFC determined that Sikorsky did not satisfy its
burden on that issue.3 15 However, the COFC did find that, under
CAS 418-50(e), the government failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Sikorsky's direct labor base was
not an appropriate allocation method.1 6
ii. FederalCircuit decision
The Federal Circuit discussed whether the six-year statute of
limitations was jurisdictional but did not perform a full analysis on
this issue because it affirmed the COFC's holding on the merits in
favor of Sikorsky.
(a) Statute of limitations
Sikorsky argued on appeal that the government's claim was time
barred by the six-year statute of limitations under 41 U.S.C.
§ 7103 (a) (4) (A).317 The Federal Circuit disagreed with Sikorsky that
the limitations period in the CDA is jurisdictional and that the court
must decide the statute of limitations issue before addressing the
merits. 1 The Federal Circuit explained that, because § 7103 lacked
any special characteristic that would warrant making an exception to

312. Id. at 223, 230.
313. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (4) (A) (2012).
314. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 110 Fed. Cl. at 220.
315. Id. at 223.
316. Id. at 230.
317. See Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (explaining that under this statute of limitations, "[a] claim accrues as of the
date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the
contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been
known" and that a party was injured (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
statute of limitations would therefore be satisfied if the claim accrued within the six
years before December 11, 2008, the date on which the contracting officer submitted
his final decision to Sikorsky. Id.
318. Id. Although the Federal Circuit had previously characterized the six-year
statute of limitations as jurisdictional, see Sys. Dev. Corp. v. McHugh, 658 F.3d 1341,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011), that decision had been effectively overruled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
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the general rule that filing deadlines are not jurisdictional,3 19 the
provision was not jurisdictional and did not need to be addressed
before deciding the merits.

(b)

320

CAS 418

Much of the Federal Circuit's analysis addressed which subsections
of CAS 418 governed the allocation of Sikorsky's materiel overhead
pool. The government argued for an interpretation of CAS 418
based on internal government documents concerning the history of
the CAS provisions and other materials, which were not published. 2
The court rejected the government's argument that the CAS should
be interpreted using non-published internal documents and the
preamble to the relevant regulations. 22
Instead, the court looked solely to the regulations themselves and,
where necessary, the history of the regulations as published in the
Federal Register and stated that "[t] he CAS standards, like any other
regulation, must be interpreted based on public authorities....
[W]e decline to rely on ambiguous language from the 'preamble' to
'
contradict the plain language of the rule itself."323
The court then
looked to the plain language of the CAS to determine whether
subsection (d) or subsection (e) applied to the allocation of
Sikorsky's materiel overhead pool. 24 The court ultimately agreed
with the COFC and Sikorsky that CAS 418-50(e) applied.3 2
iii. Significance
Sikorsky acknowledges that Systems Development Corp. v. McHugh326
was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court's more recent

319. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 773 F.3d at 1321 (noting that the statute does not use
jurisdictional terms, refer to the COFC's jurisdiction, or suggest that the provision
was "meant to carry jurisdictional consequences" and that the context of the statute
suggests it is not jurisdictional). Furthermore, no established Supreme Court
precedent interprets § 7103 as jurisdictional. See id. at 1321-22; cf.John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2501
was jurisdictional under the principles of stare decisis and the long list of Supreme
Court decisions regarding that provision as jurisdictional).
320. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 773 F.3d at 1322.
321. Id. at 1323.
322. Id. at 1323-24.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1326.
326. 658 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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decision in Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center.3 27 The court is
no longer required to decide a statute of limitations issue before
addressing the merits because the six-year limitations period in the
CDA is not jurisdictional.128 This decision can be read to open the
door for the government and contractors to enter into tolling
agreements that might give the parties more time to resolve,
mediate, or negotiate disputes and still have the possibility of
pursuing the case at a BCA or the COFC if the case cannot be
resolved by mutual agreement.
Sikorsky also demonstrates that the express language in the
regulations and the regulations' history will outweigh creative
methods of interpreting the CAS, such as utilizing citations to
unpublished materials, preambles, and self-proclaimed CAS experts
like former Cost Accounting Standards Board employees.
4.

Oil and gas cases
As an exploration of the theme of formalism in Federal Circuit
decisions, the oil and gas cases offer interesting examples. In Shell Oil
Co. v. United States,329 the court appears to have fashioned its decision
based on the expectations of the parties after considering all the
circumstances.
In other words, the decision is premised on
reasonableness and equity as opposed to formalism. In Nycal Offshore
Development Corp. v. United States,33 ' however, the court placed the
burden on the contractor to disprove any intervening causation
theory the government proposed in a lost profits case. Similarly, in
Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States,33 1 the Federal
Circuit essentially allowed the government to rewrite the terms of a
government contract through incorporated regulatory provisions.
a. Shell Oil Co. v. United States
The Federal Circuit in Shell Oil Co., in interpreting contracts from
the 1940s, avoided a formalistic approach to consider the broader
circumstances surrounding the formation of these contracts. The
result was a Federal Circuit decision that protected contractors from
327.

133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).

328. Sikorky Aircraft Corp., 733 F.3d at 1320-21; see Auburn Reg'l Med. Ctr., 133 S.
Ct. at 826 (finding that the statutory time limitation in question is a
"nonjurisdictional prescription").
329. 751 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
330. 743 F.3d 837 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
331. 745 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015).
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liability for unanticipated costs that, at the time of contracting, the
parties expected the government to assume.
i.

Background

Several oil companies, including Shell Oil Co., Atlantic Richfield
Co., Texaco, Inc., and Union Oil Co. of California (collectively, "Oil
Companies"), contracted with the Defense Supplies Corporation
("DSC") to produce high-octane aviation gas ("avgas") for the U.S.
military during World War I.332 However, the government did not
create sufficient waste processing facilities to handle the toxic
byproducts from the avgas production.333 Because the Oil Companies
did not have access to processing facilities, the firms disposed of the
toxic byproducts by contracting to dump them at a site in Fullerton,
California ("McColl site") .3' Relevant to this case, a provision of the
contracts between the Oil Companies and the government
required DSC to reimburse the Oil Companies for "any new or
additionaltaxes, fees, or charges,... which [the Oil Companies] may

be required by any municipal, state, or federal law in the United
States or any foreign country to collect or pay by reason of the
production, manufacture, sale or delivery of the [avgas]."115
In 1991, the government and the State of California sued the Oil
Companies in federal district court to recover costs for cleaning up
the McColl site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which allows parties
responsible for the cleanup cost of environmental contamination to
The Oil
seek contribution from other responsible parties.3 36
Companies argued that, under the avgas contracts, the government
indemnified the Oil Companies from certain costs, including
CERCLA costs. 3 37 After a long procedural history including multiple

lower court and appellate court decisions and a transfer of the case
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the COFC granted

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Shell Oil Co., 751 F.3d at 1284.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1284-85, 1288.
Id. at 1287 (alterations in original).
Id. at 1289-90.
Id. at 1290.
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summary judgment for the government and denied the Oil
Companies' motion for summaryjudgment 3
The COFC held that the Oil Companies were not entitled to
reimbursement under the avgas contracts for three reasons. First, the
trial court found that the meaning of "charges" in the "new or
additional charges" provision, or the "Taxes" clause, did not
encompass CERCLA cleanup costs.3 39 Second, the trial court found
that even if the contracts did require the government to cover the
costs of the McColl cleanup, the Oil Companies released any claim
when the contracts terminated and "all other issues" were settled in
the late 1940s. 34" Third, the trial court held that the Anti-Deficiency
Act barred U.S. government indemnification of the Oil Companies
based on the avgas contracts. 341' The Federal Circuit disagreed with
all three holdings.
ii.

FederalCircuitdecision

(a) Meaning of "charges"
The COFC found that "charges" as used in the "new or additional
charges" provision was intended to implicate unforeseen taxes
resulting from the avgas production.34 2
On appeal, the Oil
Companies argued in part that "charges" included "costs" generally
and, thereby, CERCLA costs specifically.3 43
The government
contended that "charges" could not mean "costs" because "costs" was
used differently and specifically in other parts of the contract.'
The
Federal Circuit sided with the Oil Companies, finding that because
CERCLA is a federal law that requires responsible parties to pay the
costs of removal or remedial action, CERCLA costs are a charge (i.e.,
cost) imposed by a federal law.344 Therefore, the court held, "the
plain language of the new or additional charges provision...
requires the Government to indemnify the Oil Companies for
CERCLA costs incurred 'by reason of of the avgas contracts."" 6
338. Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 108 Fed. CI. 422, 448 (Fed. Cir. 2013), rev'd,
751 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
339. Id. at 424-25, 430, 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. Id. at 434-35.
341. Id. at 436.
342. Id. at 432.
343. Shell Oil Co., 751 F.3d at 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Id. at 1292 (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. Id. at 1292-93.
346. Id. at 1293.
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Judge Reyna dissented from the majority on this issue because he
did not interpret the "new or additional charges" provision as a
general indemnification clause that captured production-related
costs. 3 41

Judge Reyna challenged the majority's interpretation of

"charges" to include "costs."348 Mainly, Judge Reyna argued that
"charges" in the "new or additional charges" provision relates to
taxes exclusive of CERCLA costs because: (1) "the clause is titled
'Taxes"'; (2) throughout the clause, the phrase "such taxes" appears
several times and refers back to "taxes, fees, or charges" as a whole;
and (3) the "exclusions from 'taxes, fees, or charges' are all income
and related taxes.3 49
(b)

Termination and release

The Federal Circuit also found that the COFC erred in holding
that the Oil Companies' contractual claims were released when the
contracts terminated in the late 1940s because the COFC had
incorrectly allocated the burden of proof.35 The court held that
where a breach is found, the defendant carries the burden of proof
to show excuse for breach-in this case, release. 351 Because neither
party could locate the termination agreements, the government
could not sufficiently demonstrate that it had been released from
claims in the late 1940s. 52
(c)

Application of the Anti-Deficiency Act

The Federal Circuit also reversed the COFC's holding that any
indemnification promise broad enough to encompass future
CERCLA liability violated the Anti-Deficiency Act. 53 While both
parties agreed that the War Powers Act authorized the government to

347. Id. at 1303 (ReynaJ., dissenting).
348. Id. at 1304 (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. Id. at 1304-05.
350. Id. at 1297 (majority opinion).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1299.
353. Id. at 1299, 1302. The Anti-Deficiency Act provides, in relevant part:
No executive department or other Government establishment of the United
States shall expend, in any one fiscal year, any sum in excess of
appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the
Government in any contract or other obligation for the future payment of
money in excess of such appropriations unless such contract or obligation is
authorized by law.
31 U.S.C. § 665 (1940) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012)).
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enter into contracts that would otherwise violate the ADA, they
disagreed whether that power was properly delegated and extended
to the DSC in this case.3 54 The Federal Circuit found that the
delegations of power were proper and that the agreements could
55
bypass the ADA.1
(d) Factual questions of attribution
Finally, the court found that the trial court correctly held that
there were unresolved factual questions as to what portion of the
waste was created as a result of the avgas contracts. 3 56 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit found that the COFC correctly held that the
matter of attribution remained unresolved and thereby denied the
Oil Companies' motion for summary judgment.15
iii. Significance
The COFC and the dissent in Shell Oil both would have held the Oil
Companies responsible for the CERCLA cleanup costs. Judge Reyna
in his dissent argued that the majority decision did not reflect how
the parties allocated the risk: "That the contracts are silent on who
bears the cost related to the production and disposal of avgas-related
byproducts indicates that the parties intended the cost to be borne by
5
the Oil Companies."
However, the majority took a step that is inconsistent with critics'
allegations that the Federal Circuit relies on formalism in government
contract cases and considered the context of the contracts:
World War II and the stark necessity of increased avgas production
are the circumstances surrounding the formation of the avgas
contracts.... The Oil Companies agreed to the avgas contracts'
low profits in return for the Government's assumption of certain
risks outside of the Oil Companies' control. The CERCLA charges
in this case are one such risk. The Oil Companies could not have
contemplated such CERCLA charges at the time they entered into
the contracts; indeed, dumping the acid waste at the McColl site
was expressly permitted. These circumstances confirm that the
new or additional charges provision must be interpreted to require

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Shell Oil Co., 751 F.3d at 1300.
Id. at 1301-02.
Id. at 1302-03.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1307 (ReynaJ., dissenting).
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reimbursement for the Oil Companies' CERCLA costs arising from
avgas production. 5 9
The Shell Oil decision appears consistent with Professor Nash's
preferred approach of contract interpretation that "[a] judge should
not arrive at his or her interpretation of the contract language
without scrutinizing all of the actions and communications of the
contracting parties before and after the contract's formation."360
b.

Nycal Offshore Development Corp. v. United States

In Nycal, the Federal Circuit provided what will likely be the final
word in a long-running dispute over leases for submerged oil fields
off the Southern California coast.
i.

Background

In 1982, the government issued leases for two oil fields off the coast
of Southern California.36 1 Nycal Offshore Development Corporation
("Nycal") eventually came to own a 4.25% interest in the leases. 62 In
2002, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the leases were unlawful, and the
court's decision effectively ended the owners' rights to drill for oil.363
The legal battle then shifted to the COFC and the Federal Circuit. In
a 2005 ruling, the COFC held that amendments to the Coastal Zone
Management Act in 1990 constituted a breach of the lease
agreements between the government and the several owners of the
two leases. 3" All of the plaintiffs other than Nycal agreed to accept
36 5
restitution from the government as a remedy.
Nycal determined to pursue lost profits at the COFC instead of
restitution in the hopes of gaining a larger recovery.36 6 However,
Nycal lost on this claim. 367 The COFC ruled that Nycal had failed to
prove that the government's actions were "the reason the owners

359. Id. at 1296 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
360. Nash, supra note 4, at 593.

361. Nycal Offshore Dev. Corp. v. United States, 743 F.3d 837, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 538 (2005), affd, 538 F.3d
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
365. Nyca4 743 F.3d at 839-40.

366. Id. at 840.
367. See Nycal Offshore Dev. Corp. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 222, 224 (2012)
(reasoning that Nycal had not proven its entitlement to expectancy damages), affd,
743 F.3d 837 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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ultimately would have been unable to proceed."3 "8 Going one step
further, the COFC also determined that the government proved that
Nycal's inability to obtain environmental permits for drilling,
extracting, and processing the oil was "an intervening cause" that
would have precluded development. 6 In other words, Nycal did not
prove the government's breach proximately caused any loss."
ii.

The Federal Circuit decision

On appeal, Nycal argued that the COFC improperly required it to
prove that the lease owners would have been able to overcome the
"intervening cause" the government raised in its defense-namely,
the inability to obtain the necessary permits and processing facilities
to go forward with lease exploration and development.3"7' According
to Nycal, the "intervening cause" operated as a defense to liability for
the government and, therefore, that the government should have had
the burden to prove the impact of the intervening causes on the
leaseholders' profits.372
The court rejected Nycal's framing of the case and instead set forth
the following rule regarding proof of damages in lost profits cases:
"The burden of proof on the issue of causation in a lost-profits case
rests on the plaintiff without regard to the nature of the impediment
that the plaintiff would have had to overcome in the nonbreach
world to make a profit." 7 '
The court took issue with Nycal
distinguishing between "proof of causation in general" and
"intervening causes," stating that, in lost profit cases, there is "no
ready way to distinguish" between these concepts. 37 4 In the court's
view, all facts-whether "intervening" or not-"may bear, to a greater
or lesser extent, on the ultimate issue of causation."375 Once these
facts are "identified as significant factors in the analysis, there is no
reason that the plaintiff should bear the burden of proof as to some
76
of them but not as to others."
368. Id. at 247.
369. Id. at 246.
370. Nycal, 743 F.3d at 843.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 843-44.
373. Id. at 844; see SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States, 755 F.3d 1305, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Nycal and reaffirming the rule that it is the plaintiffs
responsibility to prove causation in lost profits cases).
374. Nycal, 743 F.3d at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted).
375. Id.
376. Id.
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iii. Significance
In light of this decision, contractors, faced with the already-difficult
task of proving lost profits, must essentially disprove whatever
theories of causation (or lack of causation) the government raises
during litigation. Potential litigants in lost-profits cases should take
note of this decision before deciding to proceed-particularly if, as in
Nycal, proceeding means forgoing restitution.
c.

Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States
i.

Background

In Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States, Century
Exploration New Orleans, LLC ("Century") claimed that regulations
issued by the Department of the Interior following the 2010
Deepwater Horizon oil spill breached its oil and gas lease with the
government. 7 According to Century, these regulatory changes
violated the terms of its oil and gas lease, which it acquired in 2008,
prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill.3 78 In particular, Century
argued that changes to regulations regarding the "worst case
discharge calculation" increased the bond requirement under its oil
and gas lease.379 The COFC ruled against Century's claim, and
Century appealed."8
ii.

The Federal Circuit decision
The government did not dispute the central fact that, in the
aftermath of Deepwater Horizon, Century was required to acquire a
much higher bond of $150 million for "worst case discharge volume,"
whereas prior to Deepwater Horizon, the requirement would have
been $35 million.38 1 Instead, the dispute on appeal concerned how
the requirements were promulgated. Century's lease was expressly
subject to regulations issued in the future, which provide for the
"prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the

377. Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 745 F.3d 1168 (Fed.
Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175, 1169-70 (2015).
378. Id.at 1170.
379. Id.at 1175.
380. Id. at 1171.
381. Id. at 1176.
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Outer Continental Shelf' pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953 (OSCLA). 32

According to the government, the changes after Deepwater
Horizon regarding the "worst case discharge calculation" were made
pursuant to the OSCLA and, therefore, the lease had not been
violated. 3
According to Century, however, the government's
38 4
changes were effectively to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)
because the calculation of worst-case discharge volume was governed
by the OPA rather than OSCLA. However, the court agreed with the
government in both respects and affirmed the COFC's ruling.
According to the court, even though the OCSLA regulation
directed lessees to make worst-case discharge volume calculations
according to the OPA, the government's changes were to the OCLSA
because the notice issued by the government "only referenced and
discussed OCSLA regulations and requirements" and "never
mentioned the OPA regulations. 3

5

The court also noted that there

had been no showing that the government's changes applied outside
36
of the OCSLA context.
iii. Significance
The Federal Circuit's decision in Century should serve as a warning
to all contractors who have a contract that is subject to incorporated
regulations. Here, the particular terms of the lease were subject to one
set of regulations-those implementing OCLSA. However, the court
allowed the government to change the terms of these leases because
the government referenced OCSLA in the promulgation of changes
to regulations implementing an entirely different statute-the OPA.

382. Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 148,
164 (2013) (quoting the terms of the contract), affd, 745 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015).
383. Century Exploration, 745 F.3d at 1176. The COFC also determined that
there had been no change to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953
(OSCLA) regulations themselves and, thus, no violation of the lease. Id.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit analyzed the government's actions as changes to
the OCLSA regulations. Id.
384. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 14, 26, 33 U.S.C. (2012)).
385. Century Exploration, 745 F.3d at 1178.
386. Id.
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The decision also affirms the court's analysis of the good faith and
fair dealing standard in Metcalf3 1 7 Similar to its holding in Metcalf,
the court found that the "implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
[could not] expand a party's contractual duties beyond those in the
express contract ... ."188 Because the court found that the lease
expressly authorized the government action of changing OSCLA
regulatory requirements, the court determined that the government
had not violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
5. Damages cases
All of the cases in this final category of claims cases addressed
either the calculation of damages or whether a plaintiff was entitled
to damages. In three of the four cases, the Federal Circuit struck
down the COFC's decision, and the one case where it did not
overturn the COFC, Higgins v. United States,389 was an unpublished
decision addressing a failed attempt to avoid the impact of the
statute of limitations.
In the other three cases, however, the Federal Circuit appeared to
provide very little deference to the COFC. In SUFI Network Services,
Inc. v. United States, 9 ' the Federal Circuit found that in the unusual
circumstance where the COFC is reviewing a decision from a BCA,
that the COFC could not substitute its judgment as to the amount of
damages. Similarly, the court explained in Stockton East Water District
v. United States391 that the COFC failed to use the proper standard for
calculating expectancy damages. Finally, in Veridyne Corp. v. United
States, 92 the Federal Circuit overturned the COFC's determination
to award the plaintiff quantum meruit damages where the plaintiff
had been involved in a fraud against the government. While the
concept behind the Veridyne decision makes sense-that a contractor
engaged in fraud should not receive a benefit from that fraud-the
decision failed to consider that a government agency was a part of
the fraud and was still allowed to obtain a benefit through the
performance of the contract.

387. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(holding that an act will not violate the contractually implied duty of good faith if
such a finding conflicts with the terms of the contract).
388. Centuy Exploration,745 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 991).
389. 589 F. App'x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
390. 755 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
391. 761 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
392. 758 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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SUFI Network Services, Inc. v. United States

The Federal Circuit in SUFI Network addressed the standard of
review in the rare circumstance when the COFC is acting as the firstlevel of appellate review of a BCA decision under the Wunderlich
Act, which was repealed on January 4, 201 1 "' The Wunderlich Act
governed judicial review of administrative decisions in government
contract cases that were "within the Tucker Act and outside the
Contracts Disputes Act" and used the COFC for first-level appellate
reviews of BCA determinations.394
In SUFI Network, the Federal
Circuit refused to permit the COFC to substitute its own
methodology for calculating damages after the ASBCA had already
espoused a different methodology, finding that calculation of
damages was a factual matter.
i.

Background

This appeal involved damages from a breached contract for SUFI
Network Services, Inc. ("SUFI") to "install and operate telephone
systems in guest lodgings on certain Air Force bases in Europe."39 5
The parties entered into a contract in 1996, whereby SUFI agreed to
furnish and install equipment and operate the system free-of-charge
in exchange for the Air Force's agreement that SUFI's system would
be the exclusive means for guests to place telephone calls at their
lodgings.3 96 However, a dispute arose regarding the Air Force's role
in adhering to the exclusivity guarantee. 97
For example, SUFI
complained that other telephone systems remained in place at the
lodging facilities after the Air Force awarded it the contract and that
the Air Force assisted guests in placing calls on non-SUFI systems.398
After the contracting officer denied nearly all of SUFI's claims for
approximately $130 million in damages, SUFI appealed to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals pursuant to the contract's

393. Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 7, 124 Stat. 3855, 3859 (2011); see SUFI Network Servs.,
Inc., 755 F.3d at 1311 (stating that the procedure was applicable because SUFINetwork
was filed in the ASBCA prior to the repeal of the Wunderlich Act).
394. SUFI Network Sers., Inc., 755 F.3d at 1311-12. For a description of the history
of Wunderlich Act jurisdiction, see Vista Scientific Corp. v. United States, 808 F.2d
50, 51 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
395. SUFI Network Sews., Inc., 755 F.3d at 1309.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See id. at 1309-10 (noting that the Air Force would patch guests through to
another telephone carrier and, thus, bypass SUFI's charges).
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disputes clause."' The ASBCA granted only partial relief in a series
of decisions between 2006 and 2010, for a total award of only
approximately $7.4 million in damages plus interest.40
SUFI
challenged the ASBCA's decisions on numerous grounds in the
COFC.40 ' The COFC ultimately granted SUFI's motion for judgment
on the administrative record in November 2012 and awarded SUFI
damages of approximately $118.8 million plus interest. 40 2 The
government subsequently appealed the vastly increased amount of
the award, and SUFI cross-appealed, seeking additional damages.0 3
ii. The FederalCircuit decision
The Federal Circuit explained that under the Wunderlich Act, a
BCA's decision would stand unless it was "fra[u]dulent or capricious
or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith,
or [was] not supported by substantial evidence. '' 40 4 Here, the case was

a judicial review of agency action and, thus, under de novo review,
the COFC and the Federal Circuit should have reviewed the ASBCA's
factual findings to ensure there was substantial evidence to support its
findings and to confirm that the ASBCA's reasoning was not
capricious or arbitrary.4 5
Review would be limited to the
administrative record and would not involve taking new evidence.40 6
Guidance from prior case law directed the court to order a remand to
the ASBCA on issues the ASBCA failed to reach and decide which
ones needed to be addressed.4 7
The Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC that for one count, the
ASBCA incorrectly rejected SUFI's proposed damage calculations in
favor of calculations that were not supported by substantial
evidence.40 8 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded this count to

399. Id. at 1311.
400. Id.
401.

Id.

402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1311-12 (first alteration in original) (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 321 (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
405.
406.

Id. at 1312.
Id.

407. Id. (citing United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424, 42830 (1966)).
408. Id. at 1313-16 (agreeing that the ASBCA erred in calculating damages
resulting from the Air Force's failure to remove non-SUFI phones from the
hallways and lobbies).
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the ASBCA for reconsideration, including review of the legal and
evidentiary basis for the premises for its calculations. 0 9 Conversely,
the Federal Circuit found that for other counts, the ASBCA's
methodology was supported by substantial evidence and in
accordance with law.41 Therefore, for those counts, the court held
that the ASBCA's damages calculations should stand over any
conflicting decisions or recalculations from the COFC.411 Because
SUFI did not meet its burden to show that there was no reason why
the ASBCA's methodology was impermissible, the Federal Circuit
found that it could not agree with SUFI's argument that the
ASBCA's methodology was unsupported by substantial evidence.4 2
It therefore reversed the COFC's decision on this count and allowed
the ASBCA's decision to stand.4 13
The Federal Circuit also reviewed de novo the parties' arguments
regarding contract provisions relevant to calculating SUFI's posttermination lost

profits.

4 14

For example, the ASBCA interpreted

three sections of the contract to provide for an across-the-board
fifteen-year term from the date the contract was awarded, not
separate fifteen-year terms for each location at issue. 415 The COFC
had rejected this interpretation because it would render two of the
three sections "superfluous. "416
Although the Federal Circuit
disagreed with the COFC's assertion that the ASBCA's reading
rendered the two sections of the contract superfluous, the court
found the COFC's interpretation to be the more reasonable reading
of the relevant contract provisions.4" 7 Accordingly, it affirmed the
COFC's conclusion that SUFI's post-termination lost profits should
be calculated as separate fifteen-year terms for each site, from the
date of completion and acceptance of each respective system, and
directed the ASBCA to recalculate damages on that basis.4 18
409. Id.
at 1316.
410. See id. at 1313-14, 1320-21 (upholding the damages calculation for lost
profits associated with the allowance of calling cards and the court's conclusions
concerning a twenty-month delay in removing non-SUFI phones from a facility).
411. Id.
412. Id. at 1314, 1320.
413. Id. at 1314, 1321.
414.

Id. at 1321 (citing Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1367,

1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
415. Id. at 1321-22.
416. Id. at 1322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
417. Id.
418. Id.
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iii. Significance
SUFI Network Services is primarily focused on the proper standards of
review when the COFC performs an appellate review of a BCA case.
With the repeal of the Wunderlich Act, such scenarios will be
exceedingly rare. The case does potentially provide some insights
into the levels of support required to justify a claim of damages, but
the procedural posture appears to make this case of limited
usefulness to general government contracting practitioners.
b. Stockton East Water District v. United States
i.

Background

In 1983, Central San Joaquin Water Conservation District
("Central") and Stockton East Water District ("Stockton")
(collectively "the Districts") entered into contracts with the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") for the appropriation of
reclaimed water from a reservoir in the San Joaquin Valley.4 19 The
contracts specified that Reclamation would allocate between 56,000
and 80,000 acre-feet of water from the Central Valley Project
reservoir for processing each year.420 In turn, Central would submit
a schedule to Reclamation requesting certain amounts of water for
monthly delivery during the year.4 21 Under the agreements, the
water would be used to support agricultural needs in the San
Joaquin Valley.422
To perform the contracts, Central began to build distribution
facilities.423 Because Central needed time to build these facilities,
Reclamation did not deliver any reclaimed water between 1988 and
1992.424
In 1992, Congress enacted the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA), which required Reclamation to dedicate
800,000 acre-feet each year to certain non-agricultural purposes.4 25
Each year from 1993 until 1998, Reclamation announced that it
would be unable to provide the minimum volume of water specified

419. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1344, 1346 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
420. Id. at 1346.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1346-47.
424. Id. at 1347.
425. Id. (explaining that the CVPIA sought to protect fish, wildlife, and
threatened habitats).
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by the contracts. 426 In 1997, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, along
with the Districts, Reclamation, and other interested parties, negotiated
an Interim Plan of Operations ("IPO"), a short-term modification to
the original contracts.4 27 The modification applied to Reclamation's
delivery for 1997 and 1998.428

However, from

1999 to 2004,

Reclamation continued to use the IPO formulas to allocate delivery.429
In 1993, the Districts brought suit in federal district court against
the government for breach of contract and takings.43 ° The case was
eventually transferred to the COFC. 431' The COFC first found in
favor of the government on each breach of contract claim from
1993 through 2004 and dismissed a related takings claim.43 2 The
Districts appealed the trial court's non-liability finding for 1994,
1995, and 1999-2004."' 3 On the first appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the trial court's finding of non-liability for 1994 and 1995
and reversed the finding of non-liability for 1999-2004. 434 On
remand, the COFC found for Central and awarded $149,950 in
damages but denied all expectancy damages.43 5 Central appealed
the denial of expectancy damages.436
ii.

The FederalCircuit decision

As a preliminary matter, the parties disagreed over how to interpret
a contract provision that outlined the maximum and minimum
volumes of water Reclamation would provide Central. 3 7 The Federal
Circuit found that the contract required Reclamation to "make
available" between 56,000 and 80,000 acre-feet of water but that it was
not obligated to deliver the water unless the water was specifically
requested by Central.4 38 The court further noted that it had
previously established that "the Districts and the Reclamation [had]

426. Id. at 1347-48 (delivering between zero and 25,000 acre-feet of water per year
to each district).
427. Id. at 1348.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 101 Fed. C1. 352, 354 (2011).
431. See Stockton E. Water Dist., 761 F.3d at 1346.
432. Id. at 1349.
433. Id.
434.

Id.

435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351.
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binding contracts for specified quantities of water which Reclamation
[was] obligated to provide, and that Reclamation failed to provide
those specified quantities in the years at issue."439 The court found that
the trial court did not err in the interpretation of the provision but,
rather, in the methodology it used to determine expectancy damages.440
The court held that the COFC should have used the non-breach
world to calculate expectancy damages where the 1993
announcement had not occurred because that announcement was
the underlying reason for Reclamation not making the minimum
water quantities available.44 ' The COFC had determined that because
Central had stopped requesting the contractual minimum, the
Districts' economic damages were only the difference between the
amount Central actually requested and the amount Reclamation
made available.442 The Federal Circuit disagreed and reasoned that,
were it not for Reclamation's pre-1999 announcements that it was not
going to meet its contractual obligations, Central might have
requested higher volumes of reclaimed water.44 3 Therefore, the nonbreach world against which the trial court compared the current
status of Central should have taken into account the impact of the
announcements on Central's requests from 1990-2004. 44 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment denying expectancy
damages to Central and remanded the matter for a damages
determination consistent with its opinion.445
iii. Signzficance
The case helps to define how to calculate expectancy damages. In
particular, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the trier of fact must
consider what would have happened if there had been no breach.4 46
Overall the decision appears at odds with formalism. The Federal
Circuit did not allow the COFC to use a bright-line basis for
expectancy damages-in this case, the fact that "Central took less
water than it demanded or that Reclamation allocated to it in

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1351-52.
Id.
Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
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1996.. . .,447 Rather than such a bright line, the Federal Circuit's
decision requiring the COFC to consider what would have happened
had the announcement never been made-and the potential
requirement that the COFC reopen the record to receive additional
evidence-is inconsistent with formalism.
c.

Higgins v. United States

In an unpublished decision, Higgins, the Federal Circuit rejected a
grantee's attempts to recover on a claim that was filed more than a
decade after the termination of the grant.
i.

Background

In 1999, the Department of Labor (DOL) awarded a grant to
Devereaux Corporation ("Devereaux") to be paid over the course of
three years.448 However, when Devereaux allegedly defaulted a few
months later, DOL began proceedings to terminate the grant for
default under 29 C.F.R. § 95.61 (a) (). 4 " The parties signed a
Modification on October 24, 2001 whereby DOL paid the remainder
of a negotiated amount to Devereaux and advanced the expiration
date for the grant.45 DOL attempted to send closeout documents to
Devereaux; however, the agency learned that the corporation was
defunct and subsequently executed a unilateral closeout on May 12,
2004.451 DOL sent a preliminary settlement notice to Devereaux's
executive director, Cheryl Higgins, on May 26, 2004 ("Settlement
Notice"), which listed the possibility of additional payment
adjustments for an amended settlement, including "[u]nresolved
disputes or claims identified on the Grantee's Release. 45 2
In November 2005, Higgins sent a letter requesting approximately
$1.5 million for reimbursement of various outstanding claims.453
DOL responded in February 2006, stating it did not owe anything
454
further to Devereaux and that the grant had been closed out.
Through additional correspondence, DOL reiterated that the grant

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id.
Higgins v. United States, 589 F. App'x 977,978 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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had been terminated.455 DOL sent another letter in October 2008 in
response to another inquiry from Higgins and stated that the grant
was terminated in accordance with 45 629 C.F.R. § 95.61 (a) (2),
termination based on mutual agreement.
Higgins filed suit in the COFC on December 28, 2012, alleging a
breach of contract or, alternatively, entitlement to an amended
settlement according to the Settlement Notice or a final settlement
under 29 C.F.R. § 95.61 (a) (2) for mutual agreement.5 The COFC
found that the breach claim occurred when DOL unilaterally closed
Further, it found that the
out the grant on May 12, 2004.4'
amended-settlement claim accrued when DOL sent the Settlement
Notice on May 26, 2004."' 9 It also determined that the termination
occurred under §95.61(a)(1) based on breach instead of
§ 95.61(a) (2) based on mutual agreement. 40 The COFC therefore
dismissed the breach of contract claim and the amended-settlement
claim for passing the six-year statute of limitations and granted the
government's motion for summary judgment regarding the finalsettlement claims arising under an inapplicable statutory provision.46'
ii.

The Federal Circuit decision

The Federal Circuit agreed with the COFC that the breach claim
first accrued more than six years before Higgins filed her
complaint. 4 2 The court found that May 12, 2004, the date when
DOL unilaterally executed the closeout, was the "latest date upon
465
which a contractual claim could conceivably be seen to arise."
Furthermore, Higgins did not offer any later date that would
acceptably give rise to a breach of contract claim, particularly

455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 979-80.
462. Id. at 980 ("A claim against the government must be filed within six years
after the claim first accrues."). Further, "[a] claim accrues for purpose of the statute
of limitations 'when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the
Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action.'" Id. (quoting FloorPro,
Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
463. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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considering the contract in question had been terminated,4 amended
4
to expire, officially closed, and then processed for closeout.
Higgins also asserted that she was entitled to an amended
settlement because the grantee's release was never executed. 465 The
Federal Circuit disagreed. The amended-settlement claim related to
the Settlement Notice, which was dated May 26, 2004.'
Higgins
failed to provide any legal basis for her argument that every grantee is
entitled to a release.4 67 Moreover, the court determined that receipt
of the Settlement Notice put Higgins on notice about that contingency
and that she was aware that she did not have a grantee's release. 4, s
Higgins also argued that the October 2008 letter evinced that the
DOL converted the unilateral termination to a mutual termination,
which, consequently, entitled her to a final settlement. 469 However,
the Federal Circuit agreed with the government that the October
2008 letter did not alter the original basis for terminating the
grant. 47 0 The record showed that contemporaneous documents
specifically referred to 29 C.F.R. § 95.61(a)(1) as the source of the
termination for breach.4 7' Moreover, the October 2008 letter was
sent over seven years after DOL terminated the grant and it did not
state that it converted the termination nor imply that it would follow
up with a final settlement.4172 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
COFC's grant of summary judgment on the final-settlement claim in
favor of the government.4 7
iii. Significance
Higgins resulted in the unsurprising conclusion that the Federal
Circuit will not entertain claims asserted outside of the statute of
limitations. Moreover, the court was not receptive to either of
Higgins's arguments regarding why the suit was timely. First, it
rejected Higgins's argument that relied on a typo in a government
letter and then rejected her assertions that the government failed to

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id.
Id. at 981.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 981-82.
Id. at 982.
Id.
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take formal steps because all the parties were on notice of exactly
what was going on. The Federal Circuit will apply an objective
standard to determine the date on which a claim accrued.474
d. Veridyne Corp. v. United States
i. Background
In March 1998, Veridyne Corporation ("Veridyne"), a qualifying
company under the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a)
program, submitted a proposal to the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) for an IDIQ cost-plus-award-fee contract under the 8(a)
program.4 75 The "proposed" cost specified in the proposal was
$2,999,949.00.476 At the time, however, Veridyne knew that the
services to be provided under the extension would cost far in excess
of $3 million and in fact would cost more than $30 million.47 7
MARAD personnel also knew, according to the COFC, that the $3
million amount was merely a pretext to enable the agency to award
the contract without competition under the SBA's 8 (a) rules.478
In December 2004, MARAD issued a stop order suspending
contract performance and informed Veridyne of its view that the
4 79
contract was void ab initio because it was obtained by fraud.
MARAD did not pay Veridyne for its final eight invoices under the
contract, including invoices for work performed after the stop work
order was issued.480
On February 28, 2006, Veridyne filed a complaint in the COFC to
recover $2,267,163.96.481 The government maintained that Veridyne
forfeited its contract claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2514, the Special Plea in
Fraud statute.482 The government also filed a counterclaim under the
False Claims Act (FCA) for each fraudulent claim presented and

474. Id. at 980.
475. Veridyne Corp. v. United States, 758 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1374-75.
478. Id. at 1375. The SBA 8(a) program states that when a bid exceeds $3 million,
it is subject to open competition from other SBA-qualified businesses. Id. at 1374.
Competition would have delayed the bid process until after Veridyne was no longer
an SBA-qualified business. Id.
479. Id. at 1375.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 1376.
482. Id.
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under the antifraud provision of the CDA for the unsupported
portion of Veridyne's CDA claims.48 3
The COFC held that because Veridyne's invoices contained false
information, its direct contract claims were forfeited under the
Special Plea in Fraud statute.484 However, it also concluded that
Veridyne was due $1,068,636.33 in quantum meruit because Veridyne
48 5
had conferred a benefit on the government under the contract.
With respect to the government's FCA counterclaim, the COFC held
that Veridyne's proposal was a false claim. 486 The COFC awarded the
government $1,397,000 in FCA penalties.4 87 Additionally, the COFC
held that Veridyne's CDA claims were unsupported and concluded
488
that the government was entitled to $568,802.09 in CDA damages.
Both parties appealed portions of the COFC's decision.4 89
ii. The FederalCircuit decision
The Federal Circuit held that it was improper for the COFC to
allow Veridyne to recover in quantum meruit when its claims were
forfeited under the Special Plea in Fraud statute. 4 0 The court also
found that Veridyne's proposal to MARAD was a false claim because
it misrepresented the cost of the services that Veridyne agreed to
provide in the proposal.49'
Veridyne argued that it did not have the requisite intent to defraud
MARAD because MARAD knew that these statements were false.4 92
The Federal Circuit noted that although MARAD had knowledge
that the proposal contained false statements, the FCA inquiry did
not end with MARAD's knowledge because Veridyne's contract was
ultimately with the SBA and not MARAD. 49u The SBA did not have
knowledge that Veridyne's statements were fraudulent. 494 Even if
Veridyne believed that MARAD officials were not misled by its

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
1957);
491.
492.
493.
494.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1377-78 (citing Little v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 84, 87-88 (Ct. C1.
Mervin Contracting Corp. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 81, 86-87 (1941)).
Id. at 1378-79.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
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proposal, these false statements misled the SBA to enter the
contract with Veridyne and Veridyne intended that the SBA do so in
reliance on the false statements.49 5
The Federal Circuit further rejected Veridyne's argument that
even if the contract was procured by fraud, the invoices submitted
pursuant to the contract did not contain any false statements and
therefore could not support FCA penalties. 4 6 Claims submitted
pursuant to a fraudulently obtained contract are FCA violations
even if the claims themselves do not contain false statements.4 97
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the COFC's award of $1,397,000
in FCA penalties. 98
The antifraud provision of the CDA provides that
[i]f a contractor is unable to support any part of his claim and it is
determined that such inability is attributable to misrepresentation
of fact or fraud on the part of the contractor, he shall be liable to
the Government for an amount equal to such unsupported part
49
of the claim.
Veridyne's CEO certified with respect to each claim that the claims
were "made in good faith, that the supporting data [were] accurate
and complete... , [and] that the amount requested accurately
reflect[ed] the contract adjustment for which the contractor
believe [d] the government was liable.""' The COFC found that some
invoices, where Veridyne billed for the work completed after
MARAD's stop order, were unsupported and violated the CDA
antifraud provision."' Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
502
COFC's award of $568,802.09 to the government as a CDA penalty.
iii. Signiflcance
Veridyne underscores the risks to contractors from making false
submissions to the government. The court denied the contractor any
quantum meruit recovery and required Veridyne to pay penalties
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1943),
superseded &y statute on other grounds, 31 U.S.C. § 233(c) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c) (2012)), as recognized in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel.
Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011)).
498. Id. at 1380.
499. Id. at 1380-81 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
500. Id. at 1381 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 1382.
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under the FCA and under the CDA even though the government
apparently still received the benefit of the contract and none of the
individual invoices were false. The case is also interesting because it
relies on a particular distinction between the knowledge of MARAD
and SBA to establish fraud. MARAD knew of the fraud and was the
agency that was actually paying for the work, but MARAD was
essentially absolved from its conduct because the SBA-an agency
with no monetary interest in the contract-was misled by Veridyne in
the awarding of the contract.
B. Bid Protest Cases
The Federal Circuit's bid protest cases addressed different
challenges to and provided new guidance regarding the COFC's
jurisdiction to hear protests. In one, SRA International,Inc. v. United
States,5"' the Federal Circuit found that the COFC did not have
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the General Services
Administration's (GSA) actions related to the issuance of a task
order. 0 4 While the result in that case was a contractor losing its
appeal and a limitation on future contractors' ability to pursue
remedies at the COFC level, the decision appears well grounded in a
very specific congressional determination to deny the COFC
jurisdiction to hear such protests.
In the second bid protest jurisdictional determination, CMS
50 5
Contract Management Services v. Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency,
the Federal Circuit overturned a COFC determination that the
assistance agreement at issue was not a procurement contract falling
under the requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA)."° The court's decision in CMS Contract Management Services
represents an unusual instance where the Federal Circuit established
a bright-line rule that works to the benefit of contractors, and it also
expanded the scope of issues that the COFC can consider.
1. SRA International, Inc. v. United States
One of the more significant Federal Circuit decisions of the year is
undoubtedly SRA International, Inc. v. United States, in which the

503. 766 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
504. Id. at 1410.
505. 745 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 77675 (U.S.
Jan. 1, 2015) (No. 14-781).
506. Id. at 1381, 1386.
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Federal Circuit provided its first interpretation of the statutory bar to
jurisdiction over bid protests of task or delivery orders in the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA).5 °7 The decision
significantly clarified this aspect of FASA for the COFC, which has
somewhat inconsistently interpreted this statute in recent years.50 8
For disappointed offerors, however, the decision represents a
substantial limitation on the COFC's jurisdiction to ever hear bid
protests that are in any way connected to a task or delivery order.
a. Background
The plaintiff, SRA International, Inc. ("SRA"), initially filed a bid
protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleging that
the GSA improperly awarded an August 14, 2013 task order because
of the presence of two organizational conflicts of interest (OCI)
arising from the involvement of a proposed subcontractor of the
awardee. 509 Though the GSA found the possibility of an OCI to be
"exceedingly remote and unsubstantiated," it issued a "Determination
and Findings for Waiver of Organizational Conflict of Interest Rules"
("Waiver") on November 25, 2013 in order to waive any OCI that
might exist.510 Because of the Waiver, the GAO dismissed the protest
51
as "academic.""
The timing of the GSA's Waiver-three months
after the issuance of the task order-was critical to the procedural
posture of SRA before the COFC. When SRA filed a bid protest at
the COFC, its allegations focused on the Waiver, through which SRA
512
requested the COFC to overturn the award of the task order.
513
The COFC found that it had jurisdiction to hear the protest.

The court recognized that FASA barred it from adjudicating protests
"'in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or
delivery order,' unless the protest is 'on the ground that the order
507. 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f) (2012).
508. Compare Digital Techs., Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 711, 730 (2009)
(concluding that FASA does not bar jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim
related to task order procurement), with DataMill, Inc. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl.
740, 762 (2010) (finding that FASA bars jurisdiction over an agency's determination
regarding sole-source procurement that was made "in connection with" a proposed
delivery order (internal quotation marks omitted)).
509. SRA Int'l, Inc., 766 F.3d at 1410-11.
510. Id. at 1411 (internal quotation marks omitted).
511. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
512. Id.
513. SRA Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 247, 256 (2014), vacated, 766 F.3d
1409 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under
which the order is issued.'

514

However, the COFC drew the

distinction that while the Waiver was undoubtedly related to the
issuance of the task order, it was not issued "in connection with"
the issuance of the task order, which is what FASA requires.1 5 The
COFC's distinction between "related" and "in connection with" was
based on its determination that the Waiver did not have a "direct,
causal relationship" to the issuance of the task order because it was
issued "well after the award" and that the Waiver was a
discretionary action by the GSA that was not necessary for the
516
issuance of the task order.
Despite finding in favor of SRA on jurisdiction, the COFC later
dismissed SRA's claims on the merits. 17 SRA appealed this dismissal.
b.

The Federal Circuitdecision

Rather than address the merits, the Federal Circuit vacated the
COFC's decision on jurisdictional grounds and instructed the COFC
to dismiss the case based on the jurisdictional bar in FASA. 518 The
Federal Circuit's explanation was succinct: "The statutory language
of FASA is clear and gives the court no room to exercise jurisdiction
over claims made 'in connection with the issuance or proposed
519
issuance of a task or delivery order."
Most substantially for future protestors, the court expressly rejected
SRA's main statutory argument for a more limited reading of the
FASA ban. SRA argued that the FASA ban only applied to one of the
three separate prongs of jurisdiction that the Tucker Act confers on
the COFC. 52" According to SRA, at issue was the third prong of the
Tucker Act, which provides the COFC with jurisdiction
to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting
to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a
proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.52 '

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at 251 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f) (2012)).
Id. at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 255-56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
SRA Int'l Inc., 766 F.3d at 1412.
Id. at 1413-14.
Id.at 1413.
Id. at 1411.

521.

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (b) (1) (2012).
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SRA asserted that because SRA's protest of the Waiver was
brought under the third prong, the COFC could hear SRA's
protest of the Waiver. 22
The Federal Circuit made it clear that it does not read FASA so
narrowly. The court held that FASA "effectively eliminates all judicial
review for protests made in connection with a procurement
designated as a task order-perhaps even in the event of an agency's
'
Taking on SRA's statutory
egregious, or even criminal, conduct."523
argument, the court stated that "[e]ven if the protestor points to an
alleged violation of statute or regulation.... the court still has no
jurisdiction to hear the case if the protest is in connection with the
5
issuance of a task order."

24

The court noted that the relief SRA sought-the rescission of the
task order-demonstrated the connection between the Waiver and
the issuance of the task order.5 25 The court also rejected the
COFC's distinctions that the "temporal disconnect" and the
"discretionary nature" of the Waiver severed the connection with the
task order for FASA purposes. 26 The court explained that FASA
does not contain an exception for discretionary agency actions and
that the GSA could have issued the Waiver at any time-including
before the issuance of the task order.5 27 While the court left open the
possibility that a "temporal disconnect" could "help to support the
non-application of the FASA bar," the court did not elaborate on
what this might look like.528
c.

Significance

As a result of the Federal Circuit's ruling in SRA, there may be far
fewer protests at the COFC of agency actions that relate to task or
delivery orders. While the court's decision leaves open the possibility
that under very different facts, there could be a bid protest related to
the issuance of a task or delivery order that is not in connection with
the issuance, the court's analysis may foreclose this outcome in
practice because the court explicitly looked to the requested relief
(rescission of the task order's issuance) to inform its decision. At
522. SRA Int'7Inc., 766 F.3d at 1411.
523. Id. at 1413 (emphasis added).
524. Id.

525. Id. at 1414.
526. Id. at 1413.
527. Id.

528. Id.
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least in post-award bid protests, it is difficult-if not impossible-to
imagine a bid protest that does not request rescission of the award.
By removing this avenue of relief, there may be little incentive to
protest in the first place.
It is also anticipated that SRA will encourage agencies to issue more
task and delivery orders that fall under $10 million because these
decisions cannot be reviewed by the GAO or the COFC.5 2 As a result,
an agency may avoid review of its decision to override a CICA stay in
these circumstances as long as the resultant bridge contract is a task
or delivery order under $10 million. 3 Under these circumstances,
the GAO may lack jurisdiction over the bridge contract, and the
COFC may have no jurisdiction over the override decision itself
because it would be issued "in connection with the issuance or
proposed issuance of a task or delivery order."'
2. CMS Contract Management Services v. Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency
Contrasting the limitations on bid protest jurisdiction from SRA,
the court's decision in CMS Contract Management Services essentially
expanded the COFC's jurisdiction over certain federal assistance
agreements that are-as the Federal Circuit has now made clearproperly classified as "procurement contracts."3 2 The dispute in CMS
involved a split between the GAO and the COFC over whether a
particular kind of assistance agreement used by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to administer public
housing benefits qualified as a "procurement contract. ' 533 If it did,
HUD would be required to comply with the much more stringent

529. See 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f)(1) (2012) (listing the two exceptions for authorized
protests). Of course, FASA does not restrict protests "on the ground that the order
increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the
order is issued[,] or... a protest of an order valued in excess of $10,000,000." See id.
(delineating eligibility requirement of protestors). In practice, however, these
grounds can be used only under certain circumstances that simply do not apply to
many would-be protestors.
530. See, e.g., Serco Inc., B-410676.2, 2014 CPD 371 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 12, 2014)
(dismissing a protest of a bridge task order under $10 million even though the task
order subject to the initial bid protest exceeded $10 million).
531. 41U.S.C. §4106(f)(1).
532. CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency., 745 F.3d 1379, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2014), petitionfor cert. filed, 2015 WL 77675 (U.S.Jan. 1, 2015) (No. 14-781).
533. Id.
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standards for competition in CICA53 4 rather than the more lenient
standards available under the Federal Grant and Cooperative
Agreements Act (FGCAA).535 Adopting the GAO's determination that
the more stringent rules applied to the assistance agreement used by
HUD, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC and ruled that HUD
should have complied with federal procurement laws and competition
requirements in issuing and awarding these assistance agreements.
a.

Background

HUD is charged with providing rental assistance to low-income
families and must accomplish this goal, in part, by paying owners of
private residences to subsidize the cost of rent. 5 7

In 2012, HUD

issued a Notice of Funding Availability ("NOFA")-a term typically
used to describe solicitations for cooperative agreements-for the
58
administration and award of subsidized housing contracts. 1
Believing that the NOFA's terms improperly excluded it from the
competition, CMS, which had performed these types of contracts in
prior years for HUD, filed a pre-award bid protest with the GAO
alleging that the NOFA failed to meet the competitive requirements
mandated by CICA.539 HUD responded that CICA was not applicable
because the awards under the NOFA would be cooperative
agreements subject to the FGCAA, a statute with far fewer
requirements for competition and awards than the more stringent
CICA.54" The GAO agreed with CMS and found that the agreements
qualified as "procurement contracts" and, thus, were subject to the
more stringent competition rules in CICA because the principle

534. See 41 U.S.C. § 3301 (outlining the CICA's requirements for full and
open competition).
535. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6303-05 (expressing an overall purpose of maximizing
competition in the creation of procurement contracts as well as encouraging
competition in the creation of grants and cooperative agreements but providing no
specific competition requirements).
536. CMS ContractMgmt. Ser's., 745 F.3d at 1386.
537. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (declaring the federal government's policy of
promoting decent and affordable housing for all citizens).
538. CMS ContractMgmt. Servs., 745 F.3d at 1383.
539. Id. at 1384.
540. See id. at 1383 (noting HUD characterized the awards as cooperative
agreements, which meant they were outside of the scope of federal procurement law).
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purpose of the NOFA was "to acquire goods or services for the direct
benefit or use of the federal government. "541
HUD decided to disregard the GAO's recommendations and

542
proceeded to award the assistance agreements based on the NOFA.

Soon after HUD's announcement of its intentions, CMS filed a preaward bid protest at the COFC.543 In a lengthy and complex opinion
that the COFC noted dealt with "a morass of arcane housing
assistance statutes and regulations," the COFC found in favor of the
government. 544 According to the COFC, the principal purpose of the
agreements that were to be established from the NOFA was to
"'transfer a thing of value' to the recipient in order 'to carry out a
public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the
United States.' '

45

The COFC found it persuasive that the statutory

and regulatory scheme applicable to the subsidized housing program
provided HUD a mechanism through which to carry out its
"statutorily authorized goal of supporting affordable housing for lowincome individuals and families. '546
Because HUD essentially
"engaged in a core statutory duty of providing funding assistance to
state-sponsored" entities, the COFC found that the agreements in
question qualified as cooperative agreements under the FGCAA and
not procurement contracts under CICA.547
b.

The Federal Circuitdecision

In a much shorter opinion than the COFC's extensive review of the
"morass" of arcane housing regulations, the Federal Circuit sided
with the GAO and reversed. 54 ' According to the court, the principal
purpose of the NOFA was to procure services "to support HUD's
staff and provide assistance to HUD with the oversight and
monitoring of Section 8 housing assistance.

'549

This was evidenced

by (1) HUD's acknowledgement of its intention to "procure" these
541. Assisted Hous. Servs. Corp., B-406738 et al., 2012 CPD
236 (Comp. Gen.
Aug. 15, 2012) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 6303).
542. CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs., 745 F.3d at 1384.
543. Id. at 1385.
544. CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States, 110 Fed. CI. 537, 541 (2013),
rev'd, 745 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014), petitionfor cert. filed, 2015 WL 77675 (U.S.Jan. 1,
2015) (No. 14-781).
545. Id. at 5 63 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 6305).
546. Id. at 562.
547. Id. at 563.
548. CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs., 745 F.3d at 1386.
549. Id.at 1385.
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services in order to release agency officials to perform other work,
(2) prior HUD procurements for the same services that utilized
procurement contracts, and (3) HUD's statements that its use of
contractors here helped HUD reduce costs and provided "support
for HUD's Field Staff."55 ° Importantly, the court noted that it could
not discern a "thing of value" that was transferred to the awardees,
who acted merely as intermediaries between HUD and the entities
" ' According to the court, in the case of such
eligible for assistance.55
an "intermediary relationship, 'the proper instrument is a
552
procurement contract.'

c.

Significance

For government contractors that perform assistance agreements,
CMS potentially represents a sea change in their ability to seek
redress at the COFC. The impact of CMS is effectively an expansion
of bid protest jurisdiction over assistance agreements that, under the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of the FGCAA, are actually
procurement contracts subject to CICA, the FAR, and all of the
associated stringent rules regarding full and open competition.
Before CMS, a disappointed applicant for these types of assistance
agreements would be limited to agency-specific regulations that may
or may not offer some avenue for relief. Moreover, the FGCAA
contains no requirements regarding competitions for grants and
cooperative agreements. Thus, it stands to reason that agencies, in
an effort to streamline their operations prior to CMS, might seek to
classify opportunities as assistance agreements under the FGCAA
rather than as procurement contracts subject to CICA and the FAR.
The Federal Circuit succinctly summarized this issue in stating that
when using cooperative agreements under the FGCAA, "agencies
553
escape the requirements of federal procurement law."

550. Id. at 1385-86 (internal quotation marks omitted).
551. Id. at 1386 (internal quotation marks omitted).
552. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Curiously, the court's sole citation
for this point is a Senate Report from 1981 offering a committee's interpretation of
the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreements Act (FGCAA). Id. However, the
persuasive value of this source is questionable because the FGCAA was already in
effect at this time, and the specific amendment the committee addressed in this
report had nothing to do with the classification of cooperative agreements and
procurement contracts under the statute.
553. Id.at 1381.
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Now, however, agencies no longer have the luxury of merely
reclassifying procurements as cooperative agreements to escape the
requirements of federal procurement law. Instead, regardless of how
the agency classifies such an agreement, CICA and the FAR apply if
'
the agreement actually constitutes a "procurement contract."5 54
Thus, CMS will provide a much-needed check on agency overreach
on the use of cooperative agreements to achieve procurement goals,
particularly in situations involving intermediary contractors
performing administrative functions for agencies that provide
assistance programs. Indeed, the COFC has already applied the
holding in CMS to enjoin the award of cooperative farming
agreements by the Fish and Wildlife Service until it complies with the
requirements of CICA 5" It is also potentially significant that the
government has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, so
the Federal Circuit's decision may not be the final word. 56
In any event, CMS should certainly not be read to suggest that all
cooperative agreements and grants are now subject to CICA. Rather,
the Federal Circuit's decision does not address cooperative
agreements and grants that are properly categorized as cooperative
agreements or grants under the FGCAA definitions. As noted above,
the FGCAA provides potential awardees with no remedy for errors an
agency makes in awarding these kinds of agreements, and CMS does
not change this fact. What CMS does, however, is help clarify the
boundary-the "gray area"-between cooperative agreements and
procurement contracts that, until now, has largely been left to
agencies' discretion.
3. Adams & Associates, Inc. v. United States
a. Background
Adams & Associates, Inc. v. United States57 involves the appeal of the
incumbent contractor at two Job Corps centers.558 As a result of its

554. Id.
555. Hymas v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 466, 500-01, 508 (2014) (holding that
the Fish and Wildlife Service is not exempt from the competitive requirements of
CICA and that the agency violated the FGAA).
556. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs., 2015 WL 77675
(No. 14-781).
557. 741 F.3d 102 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
558. Id. at 104. The Job Corps program is a national residential training and

employment program administered by the Department of Labor.
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market research, the Department of Labor limited the right to
compete for subsequent contracts to operate those two facilities to
small businesses.559 The incumbent contractor, Adams & Associates,
Inc. ("Adams"), did not qualify as a small business and was therefore
560
precluded from competing.
Adams filed two pre-award bid protests in the COFC.561 In each
case, the COFC denied Adams's motion for judgment on the
administrative record and granted the government's cross-motion for
judgment on the administrative record, finding that 29 U.S.C.
§ 2887(a) (2) (A) did not require that the procurement be open to
full and open competition,56 2 that the fair proportion analysis was
conducted in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 644,563 and that the DOL
was not arbitrary and capricious in the way it conducted its Rule of
Two 56 4 analysis.5 65

b.

The FederalCircuit decision
i.

Small business set-asideprocedures

Adams argued that the plain language of the Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) 5 6 6 indicated that Congress intended to
establish a unique procurement method for selecting Job Corps
Center operators that required the DOL to maximize competition
among the eligible entities except in limited, sole-source situations.567
In short, Adams argued that the WIA did not permit the use of small
business set-asides.
The Federal Circuit held that the language of the WIA was not
ambiguous and that the plain meaning of "competitive basis" does

559.
560.
561.
562.
563.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

104-05.
104.
105.
104, 107-08.
109-10.

564. The Rule of Two provides that for most procurements, the contracting
officer shall set aside for small businesses any procurement "when there is a
reasonable expectation that:
(1) Offers will be obtained from at least two
responsible small business concerns .... and (2) Award will be made at fair market
prices." FAR 19.502-2(b) (2014).
565. Adams & Assocs. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 340, 355, 357-58 (2013), affd,
741 F.3d 102 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
566. See 29 U.S.C. §2887(a)(2) (A) (2012) (outlining the competitive basis
selection process for identifying entities to operate Job Corps centers).
567. Adams &Assocs., 741 F.3d at 106-07.
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not preclude a limited competition among
court concluded that neither the plain
provisions pertaining to Job Corps Centers
provisions forbids the DOL from limiting
Corps Centers to small businesses.569

ii.

small businesses.568 The
language of the WIA
nor the structure of the
competition for the Job

"Fairproportion" determination

Adams argued that even if the small business set-aside process was
permissible for the Job Corps Center procurements, the DOL did not
apply the FAR correctly.570 The FAR provides:
The contracting officer shall set aside an individual acquisition or
class of acquisitions for competition among small businesses
when ... [a]ssuring that a fair proportion of Government contracts
in each industry category is placed with small business concerns;
and the circumstances described in 19.505-2 or 19.502-3(a) [i.e.,
the Rule of Two] exist.571
Adams asserted that the FAR included two requirements for setting
aside acquisitions: the "fair proportion" determination and the Rule
of Two.572 Thus, Adams argued that the contracting officer was
required to make a threshold "fair proportion" determination before
applying the Rule of Two.573
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that the
plain language of the statute repudiated Adams's argument that the
"fair proportion" determination was part of a two-part process
executed by a contracting officer. 574 There was no indication in the
Small Business Act-the statute from which the "fair proportion"
language originated-that the "fair proportion" determination must
have been made on a contract-specific basis. 575 The Federal Circuit
agreed with the COFC that nothing more was required to satisfy the
"fair proportion" requirement than to use the mechanisms

568. Id. at 107 (showing that the Federal Circuit agrees with the COFC's holding
on the language of WIA).
569. Id. at 107-08.
570. Id. at 109.
571. FAR 19.502-1 (a) (1)-(2) (2014).
572. Adams &Assocs,, 741 F.3d at 109.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
575. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(a) (2012)). The statute provides that the "fair
proportion" determination is to be made "by the Administration and the contracting
procurement or disposal agency" and "may be made for individual awards or
contracts or for classes of awards or contracts." 15 U.S.C. § 644(a).
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contemplated by 15 U.S.C. § 644-namely, goal setting by the
executive branch, input from the Office of Small and Disadvantaged
Business Utilization, and the industry-specific application of size
standards by the Office 7of6 Management and Budget and the Small
5
Business Administration.
iii. Rule of Two analysis
Adams next argued that the DOL did not apply the Rule of Two
correctly. 7 The Rule of Two provides that for most procurements,
the contracting officer shall set aside any procurement for small
businesses "when there is a reasonable expectation that: (1) Offers
will be obtained from at least two responsible small business
concerns... ; and (2) Award will be made at fair market prices."57 s
Adams argued that the Rule of Two "require[d] two separate, but
inter-related, decisions-one as to responsibility, and one as to a form
of price reasonableness. ' 79 According to Adams, the responsibility
determination required examining factors pertaining to whether a
prospective contractor is "'responsible' before awarding a contract to
that contractor," including the contractor's "capability, capacity, and
past performance. "80
The Federal Circuit rejected Adams's interpretation of the Rule of
Two and noted that Adams conflated a set-aside determination with a
responsibility determination made pursuant to the FAR.' A set-aside
determination considers "whether there is a reasonable expectation
that at least two responsible small businesses will make an offer at fair
market prices," whereas the responsibility determination considers
"whether an individual contractor is responsible in the context of
awarding a contract.""' The court thus held that "[t]he DOL was not
required to impose the requirements of the [responsibility
determination]
process onto the small business set-aside
determination, and [the DOL] properly applied the Rule of Two."58 3

576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

Adams &Assocs., 741 F.3d at 110.
Id. at 110-11.
FAR 19.502-2(b) (2014).
Adams &Assocs., 741 F.3d at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (citing FAR 9.104-1).
Id.
Id.

2015]

c.

2014 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS
Significance

The Federal Circuit in Adams was tasked with interpreting the
interplay between the WIA, CICA, and the Small Business Act.
Finding that the WIA was "unambiguous as to this issue " "84 and with
these issues fairly well settled under CICA and the Small Business Act,
this appeared to be a fairly straightforward case. Indeed, even if the
WIA had been ambiguous, the DOL's regulations appeared to clearly
determine these issues and were properly promulgated.
4.

Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States
a. Background
In early 2012, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) used the

GSA's Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) 5 85 to procure services for

Emergency Notification Services in several of its medical centers, and
awarded the contract to an FSS vendor that was not a Veteran-Owned
Small Business (VOSB)."8
Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.
("Kingdomware"), a service-disabled veteran-owned small business
(SDVOSB), filed a bid protest with the GAO.587
Kingdomware asserted that the contract awarded to the non-VOSB
FSS vendor was illegal because 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) requires the VA to
first perform and satisfy the Rule of Two analysis before awarding a
set-aside procurement contract to a VOSB or SDVOSB. 58 The VA
argued that it was required to perform and satisfy the Rule of Two
analysis only when it determines that the analysis "is necessary to
meet [its] established contracting goals."" 9 In rejecting the VA's
argument, the GAO recommended that the VA nullify the current
contract award and seek a new contract pursuant to an SDVOSB set-

584. Id.at 108 n.4.
585. The GSA established the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) to provide
government agencies with a "simplified process for obtaining commercial
supplies.., at prices associated with volume buying." Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v.
United States, 754 F.3d 923, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 410706 (U.S. Jan. 29, 2015) (No. 14-916).
Rather than relying on traditional contract tools, agencies can use the FSS to order
goods and services at prices indicated in the schedule while also satisfying conditions
for "full and open competition." Id.
586. Id. at 928.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 928-29.
589. Id. at 929.
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aside. 590 However, the VA responded that it refused to accept the
GAO's recommendation.591
Kingdomware then filed a complaint in the COFC. 592 The COFC
held in favor of the VA and granted the VA's cross-motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that Kingdomware's interpretation of
§ 8127(d) was not supported by the plain language of the statute.5 3
The COFC held that "the 2006 [Veterans] Act must be construed in
light of its goal-setting provisions and thus the statute is at best
ambiguous as to whether it mandates a preference for SDVOSBs and
VOSBs for all VA procurements."

59 4

To reach this holding, the COFC determined that it need not apply
deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense CounseP 9 5 to the

VA's interpretation because the regulations themselves did not
expressly state that the subsection did not apply to the FSS.596
598
597
Instead, deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. was warranted.

The COFC found that the "clear statement" of the VA's
interpretation of the regulations' preamble was entitled to Skidmore
deference because the only statutory language that the regulations
cited verbatim were found to be ambiguous and the regulations were
silent as to what role the FSS might play in meeting the goals set by
the Secretary.599 In light of this level of deference and the "many...
165 (Comp. Gen.
590. Id.; see also Kingdomware Techs., B-406507, 2012 CPD
May 30, 2012) (same).
591. Kingdomware Techs., Inc., 754 F.3d at 929.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 929-30.
594. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 240 (2012),
affd, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 410706 (U.S. Jan.
29, 2015) (No. 14-916).
595. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
596. Kingdomware Techs., Inc., 754 F.3d at 930. The COFC explained that Chevron
requires a reviewing court to determine, by statutory construction, first "whether

Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). If it has, then the "unambiguously expressed intent" of Congress must
prevail. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, if Congress has not
spoken to the issue or if it has done so ambiguously, then the court must determine
"whether the agency's [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. at 930-31 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
it is, then the agency's interpretation must prevail. Id. at 931.
597. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
598.

Kingdomware Techs., Inc., 754 F.3d at 930.

599. Id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). The four-factor test for determining the
deference given to an agency's rule or interpretation includes (1) the thoroughness
of the agency's consideration, (2) the validity of the agency's reasoning, (3) the
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blazemarks favoring deference" to the VA's interpretation, the trial
court granted the VA's cross-motion for summary judgment."0
b.

The FederalCircuit decision

In a 2-1 decision affirming the COFC's holding, the Federal
Circuit decided the issue under Chevron-not Skidmor--because
"there [were] no factual or mixed factual and legal issues, and the
only question [was] one of statutory construction.""° Under this test,
the court concluded that there was no ambiguity in § 8127 and that
Congress's intent was clear because it directly tied the mandatory
Rule of Two contracting procedure of subsection (d) to the
achievement of the goals set pursuant to subsection (a).6°2 The court
explained that "Congress intended the VA to meet the goals set by
the Secretary," and to meet such goals, "the Secretary 'shall' use Rule
of Two procedures, 'may' use the [§ 8127] (b) and (c) contract tools,
and may elect to use the FSS at other times so long as the goals are
met." 3 Thus, the Federal Circuit resolved the issue at Chevron step
one and there was no need for further Chevron analysis.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the agency was not required
to perform a VOSB Rule of Two analysis for every contract so long as
§ 8127(a)'s goals were satisfied. 6°4 Therefore, the Federal Circuit
determined that in spite of the Secretary's goals, the Secretary need
not set aside every contract for a Rule of Two analysis before turning
to the FSS.6 ° 5 The court noted that since the implementation of the
2006 Veterans Act, the VA has consistently satisfied the requirements
for procurements from SDVOSBs and VOSBs. 60 6 The VA's approval
of the non-VOSB FSS vendor contracts at issue was not "arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law" because the Secretary adhered to his
60 7
statutory directive, which required him to set and meet his goals.
In his dissent, Judge Reyna contended that the 2006 Veterans Act
unambiguously required that VA contracting officers perform "a Rule

consistency of the agency's interpretation over time, and (4) other persuasive powers
of the agency. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
600. Kingdomware Techs., Inc., 754 F.3d at 930.
601. Id.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.

Id.at 931.
Id.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of Two analysis in every acquisition," including task and delivery
orders under the FSS.60 s Judge Reyna asserted that "an agency
cannot refuse to set aside an acquisition solely because small
businesses already receive a fair proportion of the agency's contracts."' 9
c.

Significance

Under the Federal Circuit's decision, the VA is permitted to continue
to use the FSS program, which the GAO's decision would have made
impractical. Even if the Federal Circuit had determined that the
statute was ambiguous, the court would have likely reached the identical
conclusion based on the VA's interpretation of the requirements.
C. Spent NuclearFuel: Sacramento Municipal Utilities District v.
United States
In 2014, the Federal Circuit decided only one Spent Nuclear Fuel
case 610-an unpublished, nonprecedential decision in Sacramento
Municipal Utility Districtv. United States (SMUD 1J).611 There has been
a sharp decline in SNF cases at the COFC over the last few years. In
2013, the Federal Circuit did not decide any SNF cases.6 12 However,
as recently as 2012 and 2011, the court decided six SNF cases in
each calendar year.6'3 Historically, these cases have been focused
almost exclusively on how to calculate the damages the government
owes to entities that entered into contracts with the Department of
Energy (DOE) for the collection and disposal SNF and high-level
radioactive waste ("HRW").614 As in previous years, this year's lone

608. Id. at 934-35 (ReynaJ., dissenting).
609. Id. at 935.
610. The SNF cases relate to billions of dollars in potential damages caused by the
government's failure to begin operations of the Yucca Mountain nuclear fuel
repository and the alleged breach of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Standard
Contract. See Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit's 2010
Government ContractsDecisions, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 1067, 1106-08 (2011).
611. 566 F. App'x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
612. See generally DennisJ. Callahan et al., 2013 Government Contract Law Decisions of
the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1307 (2014).
613. Joel Singer et al., 2011 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit,
61 AM. U. L. REv. 1013, 1083 (2012); Matthew H. Solomson et. al., 2012 Government
ContractLaw Decisions of the FederalCircuit,62 AM. U. L. REV.907, 957 (2013).
614. Singer et al., supra note 613, at 1081 ("[T]here has been a significant number
of similar [SNF] cases brought before the Federal Circuit, which have focused
primarily on the amount of damages owed to individual plaintiffs.").
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SNF decision also focused on the calculation of damages owed by
the government to the contractor.
1. Background
In 1983, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD")
entered into a contract with the DOE wherein SMUD agreed to pay
$40 million into the Nuclear Waste Fund in exchange for DOE
agreeing to accept and dispose of SMUD's spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste (HLW).615 DOE, which agreed to begin
processing the materials in 1998, held several similar contracts with
utilities that processed nuclear energy. 1 6 In the event DOE did not
have enough capacity to accept all of the waste, acceptance would be
allocated based on the date the fuel had been discharged from its
reactor-"oldest fuel first" (OFF).617
The contract included a
provision allowing utilities to exchange or swap acceptance slots such
that the utilities could adjust delivery schedules on their own.6 8 In
1987, DOE announced that it expected the processing facility's
opening would be significantly delayed, and, in 1989, DOE
announced that the facility would not be operational until 2010.619
SMUD operated the Rancho Seco nuclear plant until it shut down
in 1989.620 During decommissioning, SMUD stored SNF and HLW in
wet pools and expected that it would continue to do so until DOE
accepted the waste. 62 1' The annual operating cost of the pools was
between $6 million and $12 million.6 22 Because the repositories
would not be able to receive the waste, between 1992 and 2001,
SMUD built a dual-purpose, dry storage facility called an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI).623 By August
2002, SMUD transferred all of its waste to dry storage and then,
within the year, shut down the wet pools.

624

SMUD incurred

$78,558,212 in ISFSI-related costs between 1992 and 2003.625

615.
616.

Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 566 F. App'x at 986-87.
Id. at 987.

617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987-88.
Id. at 988.
Id.
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SMUD filed two separate suits-one for the period from 1992
through 2003 and a second for the period between 2004 and 2009. 126
In 1998, SMUD pursued the suit covering the first time period in the
COFC (SMUD 1).627 Determining that SMUD's decision to build the
facilities could be substantially attributed to DOE's breach, the COFC
awarded SMUD $39,796,234, which accounted for several offsets
including a $4,146,360 offset for SMUD's decommissioning of the wet
6 28
pools and transfer of its waste to dry storage.
SMUD challenged this offset on the ground that it would have
achieved a "fuel-out date" (transfer of all waste out of the wet storage)
well before 2003 had DOE not breached and actually accepted the
waste starting in 1988.629 Therefore, SMUD argued that it did not
realize any savings on account of the wet pools. 6 3°

SMUD also

asserted that another utility may have wished to exchange acceptance
slots with SMUD and, had that happened, the utility would have
achieved a much earlier fuel-out date as well.63 1 The COFC
confirmed the $4.2 million offset and rejected SMUD's 2003 fuel-out
date, finding that in order to accept the date, it would have to
speculate as to the willingness of other utilities to exchange slots with
SMUD, which it could not do. 632
The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower
court's decision in SMUD I, finding that the COFC did not use the
correct rate for assessing the value of the government's partial
breach, which led SMUD to pursue the dual-purpose storage.
The
court found an error in damages calculations with respect to $13.4
million of offsets but left the $4.2 million offset alone.634 On remand,
the COFC recalculated SMUD's damages as $53,159,863 and
reaffirmed the $4.2 million offset for the wet pool savings.63 5 At this
point, DOE sought a stay of execution ofjudgment in the proceeding
pending resolution of SMUD's second suit (SMUD I) that sought
damages for 2004-2009.6 The COFC ultimately granted the stay in
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.

Id. at 988-89.
Id. at 988.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 988-89.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
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order to determine whether the wet pool savings would apply in the
later time period.637
In SMUD II, SMUD offered testimony from DOE officials and
government experts who explained that slot exchanges would have
readily occurred had the DOE performed under the contract.63 One
expert, Frank Graves, explained that the OFF ranking would have led
to an incursion of an additional $1.6 billion that could have been
mitigated with the use of acceptance slot exchanges. 9 Because the
utilities were not competitors, utilizing the exchanges was in the selfinterest of each.6 "° Using this analysis, Mr. Graves testified that
SMUD would have removed all of Rancho Seco's SNF and HLW by
1999.641 Mr. Graves further offered that the exchange would have
cost approximately only $8.4 million-$11 million less than the
operating costs of the wet pools.6" 2 SMUD further established that
even in the absence of the economic incentives for exchanges, SMUD
would have removed all of the fuel from Rancho Seco between 1999
and 2003 and likely well before that time.643
DOE argued that because SMUD did not challenge the COFC's
rejection of its exchange theory on appeal in SMUD I, SMUD was
collaterally estopped from claiming it would have removed the waste
before 2008.644 The COFC found that it had already rejected SMUD's
exchange theory in SMUD I and that, because the utility did not
appeal the ruling, SMUD chose to live with the decision. 645 The
COFC also rejected SMUD's contention that collateral estoppel was
inapplicable because of a change in law.6 46
The trial court
distinguished the other utility cases that accepted Mr. Graves's
exchange analysis. 6"7 Although it had not determined a specific fuelout date, the COFC found that barring SMUD from litigating an
earlier fuel-out date based on the exchange theory made 2008 the de
facto fuel-out date.648
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
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The COFC also considered whether the DOE was entitled to an
offset for the money saved from wet pool storage from 2004 to 2008
by transferring the spent fuel to dry storage. 9 Had the DOE not
breached, SMUD would have maintained the waste in pools until
SMUD delivered the waste to DOE.65 ° The COFC determined that
that offset for both wet and dry storage totaled $34,987,913.651

The

COFC ultimately awarded SMUD just under $21 million for 20042008.62 The trial court also applied a negative value (-$14,284,318)
65 3
from SMUD Ito the total award across the two sets of litigation.
2.

The FederalCircuit decision
The Federal Circuit first took up the issue of collateral estoppel.
The court found that the Federal Circuit's holdings in SNF cases
subsequent to SMUD I changed the relevant factual and legal
landscape.65 4 The Federal Circuit's subsequent acceptance of damage
theories based on exchange models constitutes such a change.655
The Federal Circuit also found that in SMUD I, the question at
issue was whether the fuel-out date occurred before 2003.656 In the
present litigation, the question was whether the fuel-out date
occurred in a year after 2003 (and before 2009).657 Additionally, in
the previous case, the exchange model was speculative as to the
DOE's acceptance rate; in the present case, the exchange model
applied the acceptance rate dictated by a previous case.658 The court
also found that the issue had not actually been litigated. 659 The trial
court expressly refused to allow the parties to litigate the fuel-out
date.66 ° Further, while SMUD did accept the $4.2 million offset for
2003 in SMUD I, that acceptance had no bearing on whether or not
the matter was litigated for SMUD I. 66 1 The Federal Circuit's
precedent applying the 1987 removal rates displaced the COFC's

649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.

Id.
Id.
Id. at993.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994.
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Id. at 995.
Id.
Id.
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determination in SMUD I that the "exchange theory [would]
require[] improper speculation."66 2 Accordingly, the court found
that collateral estoppel did not apply to the question of setting a fuelout date based on the exchange theory.663 It therefore concluded
that the COFC should have allowed SMUD to litigate the questionY'
The court also found that the COFC's initial determination of a $4.2
million annual wet pool offset was upheld on appeal and, therefore,
"became the law of the case" and could not be supplanted by the
COFC in the SMUD II proceeding.66 5
Finally, the court found that the COFC erred when it combined
the awards in SMUD I and SMUD II for the purpose of reducing
SMUD's total award.666 SMUD sought damages in two successive suits
because it continued to incur mitigation costs over time.667 The
COFC determined that DOE was entitled to $34 million in offsets for
the SMUD II timeframe and that SMUD had proved only $20 million
in damages.6" However, rather than using the offsets to reduce the
damages to zero, the COFC applied the excess offsets of $14 million
to the amount DOE owed under SMUD "669 Accordingly, the court
found that, by staying the SMUD I award pending the damages
determination of SMUD II, the COFC constructively awarded the
DOE $14.3 million-an outcome violating the principle that a
breaching party's offset cannot exceed the non-breaching party's
damages.67 Ultimately, the court reinstated the $53,139,863 SMUD I
award for the 1992-2003 period, vacated the COFC's 2004-2008
award, and remanded for further consideration.6 7
3.

Significance
As an unpublished decision premised on some complicated facts, it
is difficult to see SMUTD II as providing much significant guidance for
government contract practitioners going forward. To the extent that it
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 996.
667. Id. The court dictated this procedure, developed under Indiana Michigan
Power Co. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), to limit an SNF plaintiff s
damages and, conversely, to limit the DOE's claimed offsets. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 996-97.
671. Id. at 997.
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has any significance, SMUD II provides some guidance with regard to
collateral estoppel and damage calculations generally. In particular,
the Federal Circuit confirmed that significant changes in decisional law
can preclude the application of collateral estoppe 672 and that through
not
the application of an offset that exceeds its damages a party should
673
contract.
a
breached
having
for
off
better
up
end
to
be allowed
However, the usefulness of the case to most government contract
practitioners is likely limited. In addition to the fact that it is
nonprecedential, SNF cases like SMUD II generally have not been
viewed by government contract practitioners as cases that offer much
guidance outside of the calculation of damages. Indeed, "[w]hile
many of the issues discussed in these cases are unique to SNF area
and, therefore, will likely be of little utility to most practitioners,
other issues relating to the calculation of damages generally may have
674
applicability and utility beyond the SNF context."

CONCLUSION

Many of the Federal Circuit's decisions in 2014, including some of
the most significant ones, are inconsistent with the critics' claims of
formalism and favorable treatment for the government. Indeed, the
court in some instances arrived at significant decisions wholly
Most
incompatible with an inflexible, formalistic approach.
significantly in Metcalf, the court invalidated arguments that an
allegation of a breach of the duty of good faith against the
government required the contractor to prove bad faith and a specific
intent to harm.675 In other instances, the court also arrived at
decisions inconsistent with formalism and favorable treatment of the
government. For example, in Estes Express, the court avoided a simple
formalistic approach that would have denied jurisdiction to hear a
claim from a contractor that did not have a contract with the

672. Id. at 994.
673. Id. at 997 ("[A] breaching party should never be placed in a better position as
a result of its breach.").
674. Singer et al., supra note 613, at 1083.
675. See Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 987, 990, 992-95 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (reversing the lower court's decision and holding that determining
whether the government breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires
consideration under broader standards).
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government, and in Shell Oil, the court interpreted "charges"
somewhat broadly to protect contractors from unforeseen results.67
While the Federal Circuit in 2014 had some very significant cases
that were inconsistent with formalism and government favoritism,
there were some cases that appeared to show a preference for
formalism. Bell/Heery allowed the government to avoid any
contractual obligations or duties as it observed and participated in
and seemingly approved a process that resulted in substantial losses
for the contractor.61 7 Veridyne allowed a government agency, MARAD,
to retain the work performed by a contractor at no cost where the
court did not dispute the COFC's findings that MARAD participated
in a fraud against another agency, the SBA.6 7' Finally, Century
Explorationallowed the government to make unilateral changes to its
contracts as long as the contracts are subject to regulations and the
government follows certain formalities
when changing regulations
6 79
that are incorporated into the contract.
Ultimately, this Article is a snapshot-a look at one year's worth of
decisions. There will always be some cases that appear to favor
contractors and others that appear to favor the government. One key
benchmark for analysis should be that these cases balance out-and
recently that appears to be the case in the Federal Circuit's
government contract jurisprudence.

676. See Shell Oil Co. v. United States, 751 F.3d 1282, 1285, 1290-92 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reversing the lower court's decision and
finding that "charges" may be interpreted to mean costs under CERCLA (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 69192, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (overturning the lower court's decision and finding privity
beyond a formal contract between the subcontractor and the government).
677. See Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1326, 1328-29, 1331-36 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (rejecting each of the contractor's arguments regarding contractual
obligations imposed on the government).
678. See Veridyne Corp. v. United States, 758 F.3d 1371, 1373, 1375, 1378-79,
1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (denying the contractor any quantum meruit recovery
despite acknowledging the Maritime Administration's knowledge and participation
in the fraud).
679. See Century Exploration New Orleans, LLC v. United States, 745 F.3d 1168,
1169-70, 1176, 1178-79 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that the regulations issued by the
government did not constitute a breach because the government's lease with Century
was expressly subject to regulations that provide for the prevention of waste and
conservation of natural resources under OSCLA), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015).

